C. Some Political and Economic Topics
Our previous discussion was, in accordance with the general approach of our study, formulated in subjective, rather than objective terms. That is to say, we have focused our interest on the patterns of political thinking of our interviewees, rather than on the stand they take with regard to objective political issues. As a matter of course our approach led also to a discussion of numerous political topics such as, for example, the evaluation of Roosevelt, the problem of government »bureaucracy,« attitudes taken toward »ideal society,« etc. No strict dichotomy between the subjective and objective political issues could be made. What remains now to be discussed are the attitudes of our subjects toward those political topics of the interview schedule so far not covered, though some of them, particularly with regard to the bureaucrat complex and the problem of government control of business, have been touched upon.
1. Unions
The problem of unionism was heavily emphasized in our interview schedule because it is a very timely politico-economic topic, and because we expected it to be highly discriminatory. The questionnaire item, »Labor Unions should become stronger and have more influence generally,« did indeed prove to be discriminating in the statistical sense (D.P., 3.16 for men and 3.49 for women on Forms 40–45), but the interview protocols offer ample warning against any such primitive formula as low-score = pro-union, high-score = anti-union. A certain amount of criticism of unions is universal and there is no lack of otherwise outspoken low scorers who deviate with regard to the union question. Unambiguously pro-union are only a small number of politically conscious and highly articulate left-wingers. Otherwise, there are strong reservations with respect to unions throughout our sample. High and low scorers differ more in the way these reservations are made than in the simple pro vs. anti dimension. A critical attitude is taken by people who do not belong to unions, as well as by those who are members.
Some differences between questionnaire and interview might be expected on the basis that the questionnaire calls for more or less forthright statements, whereas the interview allows the subjects to elaborate their ideas in all their complexity. Here, it would seem, the interview comes closer to the subjects' real opinion than does the questionnaire. Since the organization of labor and the issue of the closed shop affects the lives of most people in some immediate way, the factor of »alienation« and the accompanying ignorance and confusion plays a lesser part than it does, say, when people discuss »all those bureaus« far away in Washington.
Thus, the critical sentiment expressed with regard to the unions has to be taken very seriously. This criticism must not be identified automatically with reactionism. Here more than anywhere else, there is some basis in reality, and the complaints are, generally, much more reasonable, show much more common sense than when it comes to issues such as the politicians or the Jews. Labor organizations have more or less to adapt themselves to the prevailing conditions of an economic life ruled by huge combines, and thus they tend to become »monopolies.« This means discomfort for innumerable persons who in their business are faced with a power which interferes with what they still feel to be their individual right as free competitors. They have to yield an extra part of their profit to what labor demands from them, over and above the price for the commodity which they buy, the laborer's working power. This appears to them as a mere tribute to the power of the organization. It is significant, however, that at least the high scorers resent labor monopolies but not their model, industrial monopolization as such. This is not surprising. The population has much more direct contact with the labor organizations than with the organizations of industry. People have to negotiate with their local unions about extra pay, overtime, wage increases, and working conditions, while Detroit, where their car is being made and priced, is far away. Of course, deeper-lying motives of social identification are also involved.
The monopolization of labor affects also the workers themselves who feel bossed by the huge organization upon which they exercise very little influence as individuals and who, if they are not admitted, feel hopelessly »outgrouped.« This nucleus of experience in the critique of organized labor has to be recognized lest one rush to conclusions.
The element of partial truth in the critique of labor is among the most dangerous fascist potentials in this country. While there are quite a few points in the critique of labor which cannot be refuted, they are easily chosen as points of departure, in order to do away with unions altogether, replacing them by government-controlled corporations – one of the main economic objectives of fascists everywhere. No analysis of the fascist potential is valid which does not give account of the agglomerate of rational critique and irrational hatred in the people's attitude toward labor. Some characteristic reactions of our interviewees may, at least, illustrate the problem.
We begin with examples of an attitude toward labor which is very widespread among low scorers: the acceptance of unions with more or less incisive qualifications. Obviously, antilabor attitudes among otherwise »progressive« people are particularly important for broader issues of prognosis.
M 310, a thoroughly liberal and progressive member of the University Extension Testing Class, speaks about the »so-called free enterprise system which really is monopoly.« To the question about the 30 per cent wage increase demanded by labor, he answers:
»Well, don't like to see anybody set an arbitrary figure for any demand. At the same time very sympathetic to wage demands. E.g. the auto workers right now. On the other hand, the bakery workers in San Francisco are striking merely for a base rate, although all of them are making above that now: they are just thinking of the future. ... I am for unions, but I think we should recognize that sometimes they become selfish-interest groups. ... Disappointed in the labor movement as a reform vehicle, their only interest is in higher wages for their own small group, especially A.F. of L. craft unions or monopolies.«
Behind this statement looms the dim consciousness that today's labor movement, instead of aiming at a better society, is satisfied with securing certain advantages and privileges within the present setup. This is just the opposite of the typical high scorer's complaint that unions have become too political, a matter to be discussed later.
M 112, a low-scoring college sophomore, senses the danger that cumbersome, mammoth unions might become undemocratic. He is antimonopoly in the sense that he hopes to stop social trends by breaking down highly centralized units into smaller ones.
»I don't like large organizations. There should be local unions, local companies, never very large. There is Kaiser, but he's not so bad. Standard Oil is not good or I.G. Farben of Germany.«
M 620, a low-scoring convict, is typical of those who resent the interference of organized labor with the functioning of the machinery of production as a whole:
(What do you think of political trends today?) »Well, I believe seriously that labor is going to have to acquire a sense of responsibility. ... Well, to me a contract is more or less sacred.« Subject objects to strikes in general, especially to jurisdictional strikes. (What about 30% increase in wage demands?) »I believe if the unions are willing to work they should have it. But if they give no returns, completely unjustified.« (What about G.M. strike?) »Should be settled as quickly as possible, one way or the other. ... I believe both labor and business sort of ignore the little fellow. ... I am sort of bitter about this strike business. ... I feel labor should have more responsibility.«
M 711, an extreme low scorer of the Employment Service Veterans group, mixes up the collectivistic power of unions with the threat of fascism and makes, by projection, Hitler a pro-union man:
(How do you feel about labor unions?) »I don't know frankly on that. In theory I'm very much in favor of labor unions.« (How do you feel about 30% wage increase demand?) »Well, I do not approve ... because I think any wage increase demand should be made in relation to living costs.« (How do you mean that?) »As a matter of fact, I just don't think about it ... 30% wage increase won't mean a damn thing if living costs go up too.« (What about G.M.'s labor union demand for increased wages, with no increase in prices?) »Yes ... but I think wages and prices have to hit a stabilization. ...« (Interviewer reads question # 4, stating that labor unions should become stronger, and refers to subject's disagreeing a little with this item and asks for elaboration.) »Well, my disagreement on that – I'm perhaps thinking that labor unions becoming stronger would lead to a state of fascism. ... After all, didn't Hitler use the labor unions in his early days, increasing labor unions and making them stronger. ... I know we have labor unions in San Francisco which are simply little empires. On the other hand, we have others that are working for the general good. ... I certainly don't think they should be controlled as some of our senators seem to want them.«
F 340B has been mentioned before. She is of the University Extension Testing Class and scores middle on E, low on F, and high on PEC. She differentiates between the positive function of unions and their inherent evils which she describes in personalistic terms as »capitalistic« themselves.
(What do you think of labor unions in general?) »I think they are necessary – as an idea they are fine, but in practice – I have had the misfortune to meet some of the labor leaders in this area, and it was very disillusioning to me.« (In what way?) »Well, if there ever were ›capitalists,‹ they were every bit of it, running their organization just like running a business – to squeeze everything out of it.« (What do you think should be done about that?) »Well, they should not object to having their financial statements audited – should be more open about it.« (Do you think standards should be set up then, by the government perhaps?) »Yes, I think I would rather see a strong public opinion do it – makes them realize they should be more fair-minded and open.«
Although no scoring has been done, the impression created by careful perusal of the whole interview material is that the attitude which accepts unions as a necessary evil is the average one, at least among those who are not articulately reactionary.
There is an exceedingly small number of unqualified prolabor statements. The two examples to follow stem from San Quentin, both, of course, from low scorers.
M 628B, a murderer:
(What do you think of labor unions?) »Definitely in favor of the closed shop. I don't believe in private enterprise as in this country. If it was what they say it is, I would be in favor of it. ... I don't suppose the Constitution, but ... we don't live by it. ... This story of work hard, my boy, and you'll be great one day is fine ... but when you won't clothe and house, etc. the masses, I'll say that's an outrage. ...«
M 619, a sex criminal characterized by the psychiatrist as »simple schizophrenic,« is not altogether uncritical of labor but believes that the weaknesses of the unions are gradually disappearing: his unqualified acceptance is based on a somewhat empty general idea of progress.
(How do you feel about labor leaders today?) »The A.F. of L., I am in favor of it very much. The C.I.O., formerly I was not in favor of it, but as time moves on, the people seem to accept it more and more. I'm inclined to feel the faults of its inception have been ironed out ... of course, the unions in the beginning used pretty high-handed methods, but perhaps the end will justify the means they took.«
One particular aspect of critical feelings toward labor should be stressed. It is the idea that unions should not engage in politics. Since this has nothing to do with those economic experiences with labor at which the complaints of many people aim, it is a matter of plain ideology, derived very probably from some belief that according to American tradition unions offer a means of »bargaining,« of obtaining higher shares, and should not meddle in other issues. The anger about wage disputes and strikes is displaced and becomes rationalized by hasty identification of organized labor and communism. Since unions in this country are incomparably less political and class-conscious than anywhere else, this objection is of an entirely different order from those previously discussed: it is truly an expression of reactionism. However, in this area the reactionary ideology is so strongly backed by preconceived notions that it infiltrates easily into the opinion of people of whom it could hardly be expected.
M 621A is serving a term in San Quentin for theft. He scores low on E and F but high on PEC.
»I admire unions, but they shouldn't agitate.« (Evidently referring to any political activities.) »They shouldn't try to get more money, but should help people more. They should want to keep prices down like anyone else ... unions have no business in politics.«
M 627, another San Quentin man, scores low on E and PEC but high on F. He is a psychopathic alcoholic convicted for what seems to be a minor sex offense.
(What about the P.A.C. of the C.I.O.?) »No, politics should be let alone. Keep politics out of any organization. I just feel that labor and politics won't mix.« (Do you think it ought to be prohibited?) »Yessir.«
Finally just one example from a San Quentin high scorer, M 656A, who is by no means extreme:
(P.A.C.?) »Well, I don't say they should go into politics, they should work through their representatives ... as a whole they shouldn't enter into politics.« (Why not?) »If they go into politics, they're demanding a lot on the side, where rightfully they should take it to the lawful legislative body. ... As far as I am concerned, politics shouldn't enter into business, and these unions are a business.«
That many statements of forthright hostility to labor can be found in our material is not astonishing. The striking fact, however, is that such statements occur not only among high scorers but again also among medium and low scorers.
We again limit ourselves to a few examples which will give an idea of the structure of unqualified anti-unionism.
M 202, a construction engineer, scoring generally very low, is nevertheless strongly identified with the entrepreneurs. His interviewer, as was mentioned above (p. [324]), called him »a person who is conservative but not fascist.« His invectives against labor, however, make this evaluation appear to be a little too optimistic. As an interesting deviation, a full account of his antilabor stand should be given.
In connection with the discussion of his work subject was asked about his attitude toward labor unions. His response was, »I am hipped about unions; there you have a hole in me!« He joined a company as a strike-breaker in 1935. He took on a job as a chemist. At that time he was just out of California and there was a depression on. He had no strong feeling about unions then, but just wanted a job. However, he did feel that a man had a right to work if he wanted to, and he had no compunction about taking another man's job. He continued with the company after the strike was over. He described himself as a »company man,« and, consequently, as having the company point of view. When he works for a company he is one hundred per cent for that company's interests, otherwise he would not stay with them. He has two objections to unions: (1) their policy of assuming that older men are better than younger men and giving the better jobs to them rather than to newcomers; (2) the closed shop. He thinks men should be allowed to »enjoy their work.« If men know that they are going to be kept on a job even if they don't work hard, it does not encourage them to do their best. For example, he hired two shop stewards whom he found were no good, so he fired them; but the union demanded that he take them back, which he had to do, as otherwise he would have had no one to work for him. If a man sees that the fellow next to him goes slow on the job and yet makes the same wages, he will have no incentive to work hard and pretty soon he, too, will slow down. The unions should not prevent a man from working who does not want to join a union. The interviewer suggested that the main purpose of the closed shop was to bargain for rates of pay. Subject replied that if a group of men would band together to rate themselves and ask for more pay for the skilled workers, or to work out better means of production, that would be all right. If a company is not willing to pay for skilled work, they don't need to work there. By way of a summary, it may be pointed out that the subject's objections to unions boil down to a feeling that unions not only do not foster hard work, but even discourage it.
This case seems to be that of a man who, although politically unbiased, became highly antagonistic to labor through concrete experience. It should be emphasized that, in spite of his own description of himself as a »company man,« he by no means admires businessmen, thinks that poverty could be done away with by changes in our social system, and favors government control in many respects. His views may be summarized as being torn by a conflict between very progressive general ideology and violent reactionary impulses within the sphere of his own immediate interests – a configuration that may be indicative of a dangerous pattern of potentialities in many »liberals.« It seems, however, that the inconsistency of this subject is not so much due to psychological factors as to his professional position. His reactionary traits are derived from his function as a member of the technological hierarchy who has to look out for »efficiency« and finds that union interference tends to lower this efficiency rather than to enhance it. Thus his attitude is not really so inconsistent as it appears on the surface: one might rather say that his over-all progressiveness clashes with his technological progressiveness because the two kinds of progress by no means harmonize objectively under the present conditions of production.
The 22-year-old women, F 316A, is structurally similar. She is a low scorer who turns violently antilabor on account of some grudges she has developed in her work as a junior chemist in an oil development company.
Subject feels that the present labor situation is very bad because of all the strikes and that industry is really hamstrung. The big unions are asking too much. (What about the union at S.?) »The S. union (C.I.O.) is undemocratic because the department heads and the junior chemists make all the decisions, then tell the members about it at meetings, and they are not even members of the union.« (You also have a company union at S., don't you?) »You mean the Association of Industrial Scientists? It is not a company union« (rather angrily). »That was a dirty trick of the C.I.O. – or rather not a dirty trick but a ruse – to accuse it of being a company union, because then it could not be registered with the W.P.B. and so could not become a bargaining agent for the employees. They thought if they could prevent it from being registered for one or two years that it would die. Because it is not the bargaining agent it cannot make a contract for the workers, it can only hint to the company what it would like. Although the A.I.S. only has a chapter at S., I don't think it is company dominated, although I have no proof.« (Don't the laboratory assistants get paid almost as much as the junior chemists?) »Yes, when the junior chemists were getting only $170 a month and the C.I.O. secured a raise to $180 for the laboratory assistants, the company had to raise the junior chemists to $200 a month. The C.I.O. complains that they do all the work and yet the junior chemists won't join.« (Was not the raise a good thing?) »Yes, but I still would like to see what the A.I.S. could do if it were registered: maybe it wouldn't do anything.«
As to the high scorers, the key theme of their antilabor ideology is that of the racket. They regard the pressure exercised by organized labor as illegitimate in a way comparable to organized crime and conspiracy – the latter being one of the high scorers' favorite topics anyway. To them, whose moralism has been emphasized from time to time in this book, the concept of the free market coincides with the moral law, and any factors which introduce, as it were, an extra-economic element into the business sphere are regarded by them as irregular. Incidentally, this suspicion does not pertain to industrial monopolies and their pricing agreements but merely to the supposedly monopolistic structure of unions. Here again the idea of »legitimacy« – of identification with the strong – comes into play. Industrial combines seem, according to this kind of thinking, to be the outgrowth of a »natural« tendency, labor organizations a banding together of people who want to get more than their due share.
Viewed from a purely psychological angle the idea of »labor racketeering« seems to be of a nature similar to the stereotype of Jewish clannishness. It dates back to the lack of an adequately internalized identification with paternal authority during the Oedipus situation. It is our general assumption that the typical high scorers, above all, fear the father and try to side with him in order to participate in his power. The »racketeers« are those who by demanding too much (though the subject wants as much himself) run the risk of arousing the father's anger – and hence the subject's castration anxiety. This anxiety, reflecting the subject's own guilt feelings, is relieved by projection. Thinking in terms of in- and outgroup, the high scorer who wants to »outgroup« the others is continuously prone to call them the ingroup. The more he tends himself, on account of his pretense to »status,« to circumvent the »normal« channels of free competition, the more he is likely to blame those he deems weak for the very same thing. Workers become »racketeers,« criminals to him as soon as they organize. They appear as the guilty ones after the pattern of »peddler bites dog.« Such psychological tendencies are, of course, magnetically attracted by any elements of reality which fit into the projective pattern. Here, labor organizations afford a rare opportunity.
M 352, a shift foreman who calls himself a »head operator,« scores high on all scales.
»Well, at Standard Oil, no unions recognized. I've never been a union man. Through union there is strength, if it's run okay, but a lot of unions of today have developed into a racket, and a source of political influence. The C.I.O. Political Action Committee particularly ... politics and unionism shouldn't become too involved. The unions shouldn't become a political organization; and the A.F.L. has developed into a racket for making money. The officers keep themselves in positions practically until they die, with no strings on how they use the money, and that should be controlled ... but if the local organization can run itself in an orderly fashion, okay, if the officers are conservative, but the minute they get too liberal, use a strike as a first weapon instead of as a last resort ... etc.«
Here, as in many instances, critique is directed against the largeness of unions per se; with the romantic idea that purely local organization, being less institutionalized, would be better automatically.
M 658, the San Quentin man quoted above, goes so far as plainly to advocate the abolition of unions:
(Political trends today?) »Oh, I think we are going to be ruled by a lot of clowns, by a lot of labor unions. ... Look at all these working stiffs ... that don't know anything else, but how to drive a nail ... they try to run things, because a few hundred thousands of them get together.« (What ought to be done?) »Straighten them out, show them where they belong. ... Take away their charters.« (Meaning?) »Well, every union has to have a charter. Abolish them. If necessary, abolish their meetings.« (What about strikes?) »That's what I'm thinking of ... they're a detriment to the country.« (How should strikes be handled?) »Refuse to reemploy them, or fine them, I don't believe in sweat shops either, but this quittin' when you're making $150 a week anyway – kind of silly. Create inflation.« (Subject had earlier made a remark in discussing vocation and income – which interviewer neglected to record – to the effect that he himself thinks in terms of saving perhaps $500 or so, e.g., by theatre work, and then quitting for a while. Note subject's highly exaggerated fantasies of wartime wages.)
A few statements of extreme anti-unionism can be found among the Los Angeles sample. Perhaps the 20-year-old boy, 5014, high on E and PEC and middle on F, represents a certain kind of war veterans' anti-unionism:
When asked about organized labor he says: »I am against it.« He doesn't know the difference between the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. but he feels »like many of the veterans, we worked for nothing while the workers at home were on strike and making good money.«
The contrast between this subject's hostility and his complete lack of information is striking.
5031–5032 are a husband and wife in a very high income group. Both are high on PEC, low on F, and low-middle on E. For them violent anti-unionism is concomitant again with contempt for human nature: they regard unionism simply as a device of the lazy ones to dodge labor.
Both of them are antilabor. The husband is quite vehement about this. Although he expects prosperity to continue he feels it will be at the cost of a continual fight against labor's demands. He feels that labor's demands are unreasonable and that with labor's recent victories that »even if one met labor's demands one certainly does not get a day's work out of carpenters, plumbers, etc.« Both of them claim to be without prejudice with regard to various minorities. It is interesting, however, that they did raise the issue of the acceptance of Jewish children in the school where their son went.
F 5043, an extremely high-scoring middle-aged housewife, belongs to that school of potential fascists who find that »everything is a mess.« She first creates in true »we-the-mothers« style the imagery of a desperate crisis and then puts the blame on the labor situation.
»I have never seen anything like this,« she lamented when asked about the labor situation. »What have our boys been fighting for? Why, they come back to find that they have to go without a lot of things ... not even a place to live ... all because of the strikes.« Thus she blames labor for the present crises and resents the growth and strength of labor unions. She also feels that there is an irreconcilable breach between veterans and the workers and fears internal strife. She also blames the strikers for the growing trend of unemployment and is very pessimistic about the possibility of full employment. However, she does not feel that there is too much government interference and is rather vague about the role of big business and free enterprise. In fact, she seems to harbor only very strong antilabor and antistrike feelings, without any strong convictions on other issues. »It's just a terrible mess,« she repeated, and she does not think the layman should get his hands dirty by »messing with politics.«
Whereas the low scorers who generally take a »pro, but« attitude toward unions insist on the soundness of the principle but object that unions are »going too far,« getting more, as it were, than their share, the typical high scorers blame them indiscriminately for the supposedly critical social situation, for the standardization of life (5001 and 5003), and for forthright dictatorial aims. To the high scorers anti-unionism is no longer an expression of dissatisfaction with concrete conditions from which they might have suffered, but a plank in the platform of reactionism which also automatically includes anti-Semitism, hostility toward foreign countries, hatred of the New Deal, and all those hostile attitudes which are integrated in the negative imagery of American society underlying fascist and semifascist propaganda.
2. Business and Government
As was to be expected, the general ideological pattern pertaining to government interference in business is highly consistent with that which pertains to labor. The average opinion – if such a term, without proper quantification, is allowed – seems to be that a certain degree of government control is indispensable, particularly in wartime, but that it contradicts basically the principle of economic liberalism. State interference still falls within the category of the necessary evil. To the high scorers in particular the government interference in business is just another aspect of the usurpation complex, a matter of dictatorial arbitrariness jeopardizing the rights of the hard-working money earners. But is should be noted again that there is no sharp line between high and low scorers with regard to government interference, whilst the how, the way in which both groups express their critical attitude, differentiates.
The following examples of a partly positive attitude toward government interference are chosen from medium and high scorers.
F 340A, of the Extension Testing Class, a young clerk, is middle on E but high on F and PEC. She is interesting because of a certain attitude of intellectual fairness expressing itself in attempts to see also the other side of the picture: an »antiparanoid« trait of the American frame of mind which, incidentally, is among the strongest bulwarks against fascism as far as subjective factors are concerned.
She doesn't believe in government control of industry. Maybe it would be all right for the government to take over transportation, gas, electricity, and water. (Why?) Maybe they could do it cheaper; she is not sure about that. Anyway, if there was a strike, like on the Key System they would be holding up everything and the government could make them go back to work. »When the government tells you to do something, you do it.«
The quotation shows an ambiguous element in the affirmation of government interference: whereas the latter is resented as a violation of liberalism, it is, simultaneously, appreciated as a potential means to keep organized labor at bay. It should be remembered that the National Socialists always complained about the »Welfare State« of Weimar but later on surpassed by far any state interference ever attempted by German socialist governments.
The high-scoring parole officer, M 109, is reminiscent of F 340A in so far as his support for some kind of government interference is authoritarian rather than favorable to any restrictions on the anarchy of free enterprise or to rational planing for the sake of all. (Cf. quotations on pp. [362, 366 above.])
Those who are outspokenly set against government controls again comprise both low and high scorers. Here, of course, the low scorers are particularly interesting.
The already quoted M 711, an »easy going« low scorer, is opposed to state interference simply because he feels a fascist potential in it, apparently unaware of the progressive function this interference had under Roosevelt:
(Government control?) »I don't. There, again, that could be a road to a fascist state eventually. Certain controls would have to be exercised.«
In spite of his leftist ideology this man shows symptoms of a confusion which may make him the prey of pseudoprogressive slogans of fascist propaganda: it is the same man who justifies his anti-union attitude with the spurious assertion that Hitler was in favor of unions.
M 204, another low scorer, a young man of the Psychiatric Clinic group, suffering from anxiety neurosis, calls himself a socialist and feels that the New Deal was too conservative, but states, nevertheless:
The government should not be completely in control of everything. Favors something like the Scandinavian system: CCF, full employment, labor government, favors cooperatives. »I think it will come that way in this country. Government control can be run wrong. Instead we should preserve individual freedom and work through education.«
To sum up: the low scorers' criticism of government interference is based on the traditional idea of freedom, the fear of an authoritarian abolition of democratic institutions, and an individualistic way of living. This makes for a potential resistance against any attempts at a planned economy. There is a possibility that a good many traditional values of American democratism and liberalism, if naively maintained within the setup of today's society, may radically change their objective functions without the subjects even being aware of it. In an era in which »rugged individualism« actually has resulted in far-reaching social control, all the ideals concomitant with an uncritical individualistic concept of liberty may simply serve to play into the hands of the most powerful groups.
The statements against government control of our high scorers are of a completely different kind. To them, unionism, New Dealism, government control are all the same, the rule of those who should not rule. Here resentment of government interference is fused with the »no pity for the poor« complex.
The San Quentin »tough guy,« M 664b:
(Political trends today?) »Well, the way it's agoing now, I think it's a detriment to our country.« (How do you mean that?) »I think a person should earn a living instead of expecting the government to give it to him. I don't believe in this New Deal and I don't believe in labor running the country. ...If a man can't make a profit in his business, he'll close it down. ...«
The San Quentin murderer, M 651a, who is serving a life sentence, is set against government interference, his point of view being that of the businessman who talks »common sense.«
(What about government controls over business?) »No, I believe in free enterprise. I believe that business should be able to conduct their own business, except during the war we had to have ceiling prices. ...But competitive business makes low prices. ...«
It may be noted that the feeling, even of the high scorers, with regard to government control as such, though it represents to them the hated New Deal, does not seem to be as »violent« as their anti-unionism. This may be partly due to the authoritarian undercurrent which, somehow, makes them respect, to a certain extent, any strong government, even if it is built on lines different from their own, partly from the rational insight into the necessity of some government interference. Many of our interviews were conducted during or shortly after the war, at a time when it was obvious that nothing could be achieved without government control, and it is this fact to which reference is frequently made, mostly as a qualification of the rejection of government control. This, however, certainly depends largely on the situation, and if interviews should be conducted today, the picture would very probably be different.
There is one particular issue which deserves some attention in this connection, the attitude of our subjects toward monopolism. On the one hand, monopolies are the outgrowth of free enterprise, the consummation of rugged individualism; on the other hand, they tend to assume that kind of noncompetitive control which is rejected when exercised by the government. Probably no »public opinion« concerning monopoly has crystallized so far, mainly because much fewer people are aware of the anonymous and objective power of big combines than are aware of official legal measures of the state. However, a few examples may illustrate how the problem of institutionalized superbusiness is reflected in the minds of some of our subjects.
M 115, a conventional but nonfascistic fraternity man, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC, is set against »this Marxian stuff,« but nevertheless, feels:
»Big business should be controlled when it gets too large. In some fields, like transportation, power, etc., large-scale organization is necessary. The main thing there is to prevent monopoly, and to have limitations on profits.«
The unresolved contradiction between this man's strongly antisocialist and equally outspoken antimonopoly attitudes, is in all probability characteristic of a very large section of the population. In practice, it amounts to an artificial »holding up« of economic developmental tendencies, rather than to a clear-cut economic concept. Those layers of the European middle class which were finally enlisted by fascism were also not infrequently set, in ideology, against the big combines.
M 118, a low-scoring man of the University Extension Testing Class, sees the problem but is still so deeply imbued with traditional economic concepts that he is prevented from following his logic to its conclusions.
»The emphasis now is on ›free enterprise,‹ but that often results in monopoly, the big concerns squeezing the little guys to death. There is too much of a gap between the rich and the poor. People climb up by pushing others down, with no regulation. For this reason, government should have more influence economically, whether or not it goes as far as socialism.«
The same man criticizes Wallace for being »too impractical.« One cannot escape the impression that monopolism is used as a vague negative formula but that very few subjects are actually aware of the impact of monopolization on their lives. The union issue, in particular, plays a much bigger role in over-all ideology.
3. Political Issues Close to the Subjects
It has been pointed out in the early part of this chapter that political confusion and ignorance, and the gap between surface ideology and concrete reactions, are partly due to the fact that the political sphere, even today, seems to most Americans too far away from their own experiences and their own pressing interests. Here we go briefly into a discussion of some political and economic topics of the interview schedule which, for imaginary or actual reasons, are closer to the hearts of our subjects, in order to form at least an impression on how they behave with regard to these matters, and whether their behavior differs markedly from that in the field of »high politics.«
First, an illustration of what may be called »imaginary closeness.« Our interview schedule contained at least one question which was, in the middle of its realistic surroundings, of a »projective« nature. It was concerned with the $25,000 income limit. Neither is this question a pressing political issue nor could many of our interviewees be expected to have any immediate personal interest in limitations of income on such a high level. The answers to this question, which would deserve a thoroughgoing analysis of its own, are indicative of an element of the American dream much more than of political attitudes. There were exceedingly few among our subjects who wanted to accept such an income limitation. The utmost concession they made was the acknowledgment that one can live on this amount. The prevailing view, however, was that, in a free country, every person should be allowed to earn as much as he can, notwithstanding the fact that the chance to make as much today has become largely illusory. It is as if the American kind of utopia was still much more that of the shoeshine boy who becomes a railroad king, than that of a world without poverty. The dream of unrestricted happiness has found its refuge, one might almost say its sole refuge, in the somewhat infantile fantasy of infinite wealth to be gathered by the individual. It goes without saying that this dream works in favor of the status quo; that the identification of the individual with the tycoon, in terms of the chance to become one himself, helps to perpetuate big business control.
Among those subjects who are outspokenly in favor of the income limit is the San Quentin check-writer, M 664C, a high-scoring man, so full of fury and envy against everything that he does not even like the wealthy.
(What about $25,000 limit on salaries?) »What the hell is that for? That's no more than fair; hell, that's too much money anyway.«
The apparent radicalism of this man can be appreciated only if one recollects that it is he who is outraged by the idea of feeding starving countries.
The very widespread feeling of our subjects on the $25,000 income limit can be summed up in the eager plea of M 621A, of the San Quentin Group, a low scorer on E and F but a high scorer on PEC.
»They shouldn't do that. If a man has the ability, more power to him.«
The next few topics are characteristic of the aforementioned tendency of our subjects to become more rational and »progressive« as soon as institutions or measures of a supposedly »socialistic« nature, from which the individual feels he can draw immediate benefits, are brought into the discussion. OPA and health insurance are examples.
Our interviews seem to show that OPA, also a »bureaucratic« agency of government interference, is very generally accepted. Here are a few examples, picked at random:
Again M 621A:
(OPA?) »I think it's done a very wonderful thing in this country. May have gone too far, e.g., in the housing situation in San Diego.« (Subject thinks the OPA should have solved the housing situation.)
One of the few exceptions is the wealthy Los Angeles couple, 5031 and 5032, who are »disgusted and fed up with the New Deal, priorities, and all this damn red tape created by OPA.«
Most others are in favor of OPA, sometimes, however, with a certain strain of punitiveness, such as the San Quentin low scorer, M 627, already quoted:
»Well, the OPA is doing a good job if they control this black market.«
This comes out most strongly in the interview of the San Quentin high scorer M 658, the man who wants to abolish labor unions.
»If (the OPA) had an iron glove underneath their kid gloves, be all right. They fine a guy $100 – for making $100,000.«
The general appreciation of OPA is the more interesting since this institution has been under constant newspaper attacks for many years. But here the advantages, particularly with regard to the housing situation, are so obvious that ideological invectives apparently lose some of their impact on the population. To demand the abolition of OPA because of the »damn red tape« in Washington may mean that one has no roof over one's head.
Something similar holds true of health insurance. High and low scorers, with very few exceptions, concur in its appreciation. M 656A, a high scorer of the San Quentin Group, serving a term for second-degree murder, after having stated that a person can live on $25,000 a year but should be allowed to make what he is capable of making, and who certainly cannot be called a socialist, answers to the question about public health insurance, »I'm for it.«
The above quoted easy-going, low-scoring man, M 711, is enthusiastic:
»Public health insurance? Unqualifiedly yes ... important as almost any measure of ideal society.«
Finally, our attention should be directed toward an economic area which is of the utmost importance for the formative processes of fascism. This is taxes. It is perhaps the point at which pent-up social fury is most freely given vent. With the high scorers, this fury is never directed overtly against basic conditions but has nevertheless the undertone of desired violent action. The man who bangs his fist on the table and complains about heavy taxation is a »natural candidate« for totalitarian movements. Not only are taxes associated with a supposedly spendthrift democratic government giving away millions to idlers and bureaucrats, but it is the very point where people feel, to put it in the words of one of our subjects, that this world does not really belong to the people. Here they feel immediately that they are required to make sacrifices for which they do not get any visible returns, just as one of our subjects complains that he cannot see what he can get out of the war. The indirect advantages each individual may draw from taxes paid are obscure to him. He can only see that he has to give something without getting anything back, and this, in itself, seems to contradict the concept of exchange upon which the free market idea of liberalism is built. However, the extraordinary amount of libido attached to the complex of taxes, even in a boom period, such as the years when our subjects were interviewed, seems to confirm the hypothesis that it draws on deeper sources of the personality as much as on the surface resentment of being deprived of a considerable part of one's income without visible advantages to the individual. The rage against the rational tax system is an explosion of the irrational hatred against the irrational taxation of the individual by society. The Nazis knew very well how to exploit the complex of the »taxpayer's money.« They went so far as to grant, during the first years of their rule, a kind of tax amnesty, publicized by Goering. When they had to resort to heavier taxation than ever before they camouflaged it most skilfully as charity, voluntary donations, and so forth, and collected large amounts of money by illegal threats, rather than by official tax legislation.
Here are a few examples of the antitaxation complex:
The high-scoring man, M 105, who is violently anti-Semitic and associated with the »lunatic fringe,« says:
»It is the taxpayer's money that has been put into South America; other countries will think we are fools.«
M 345, a radar engineer of the Extension Testing Class, who scores middle on E, low on F, but high on PEC, believes:
(What about government control of business?) »It has gotten to the point where it is requiring too much of the citizens' tax money and time.«
Again, the taxpayer's complex is not limited to high scorers. The low-scoring man, M 116, the deviate case of a conformist, conventional conservative definitely opposed to prejudice, strongly identified with his father, accepts his Republican views:
»... also because businessmen generally don't like the taxes.«
In case of a new economic crisis, where unemployment would necessitate high taxation of people whose incomes have shrunk, this complex would undoubtedly play an exceptionally dangerous role. The threat is the more serious since, in such a situation, a government which would not impose taxes would fail, while one which would take steps in this direction would invariably antagonize the very same group from which totalitarian movements most likely draw their support.
4. Foreign Policy and Russia
Lack of information on the part of our subjects prevails, even more than anywhere else, in the area of foreign politics. There are usually rather vague and misty ideas about international conflicts, interspersed with morsels of information on some individual topics with which the subjects either happen to be familiar or to which they have taken a fancy. The general mood is one of disappointment, anxiety, and vague discontent, as symbolically epitomized by the medium-scoring woman, F 340B: »Seems we haven't got any foreign policy.«
This may easily be a mere echo of newspaper statements frequently made at the time of the study by columnists such as Walter Lippman and Dorothy Thompson. Repeating them transforms the feeling of insecurity and disorientation of many of our subjects into the semblance of critical superiority. More than in any other political sphere, our subjects live »from hand to mouth« in the area of international affairs.
There is a striking lack of a sense of proportion, of balanced judgment, considering the importance or unimportance of topics of foreign politics.
One illustration, stemming from the »easy going« low scorer M 711:
(Major problems facing country?) »Hard question to answer ... Perhaps the main one is how we're going to fit in with the rest of the world. ... I'm a little concerned about what we seem to be doing in China. ... If we are a carrier of the torch of the Four Freedoms, I think we are a little inconsistent in our maneuverings in China and Indonesia.«
This statement seems to be a »day residue« of continuous newspaper reading rather than the expression of autonomous thinking. Yet it should be noted that it remains within the anti-imperialist frame of reference of the low scorer.
The symbol of political uneasiness is the atom bomb which is dreaded everywhere. The stand taken toward the atom bomb seems to differentiate the high from the low scorers. As is to be expected, also for psychological reasons, the high scorers are all out for secrecy. Here, as elsewhere, they »want to keep what we have.«
M 662A, the San Quentin »tough guy,« high on all scales:
(Threats to present form of government?) »Atom bomb. If these other countries get it, they're going to use it on us and we're going to have to look out for Russia. ...I'm for Russia, but ... I think sooner or later we're going to go to war with them.«
As to the prospect of a devastating war, this man seems to take a fatalistic view as if it were a natural catastrophe rather than something dependent on humans. This is in keeping with our clinical knowledge of the male high scorers' psychological passivity (cf. p. 575).[21]
The low scorers either want to outlaw the atom bomb or to make the secret public:
M 627, the alcoholic sex-offender, low on E and PEC but high on F:
(Major problems facing this country?) »Well, I think this atom bomb.« (Solution?) ... »Well, it ought to be outlawed and money appropriated to see if we can't use that power for good.«
F 515, the »genuine liberal« who is to be discussed in detail in Chapter XIX (p. [505, below]), pleads for international atomic control:
»Truman doesn't want to give away the secret of the atom bomb – I think he should. It's already out anyway.«
Although the over-all ideology is fear of war, the high scorer's attitude indicates that, while deeming war inevitable, they have some underlying sympathy for war-making, such as that found in the Los Angeles high-scoring radio writer 5003 characterized as highly neurotic:
As for the world state, he expects anything at the present time. »Why shouldn't we have further wars? We are animals and have animal instincts and Darwin showed us it is the survival of the fittest. I'd like to believe in the spiritual brotherhood of men, but it's the strong man who wins.«
This kind of phrasing, »why shouldn't we have further wars,« is indicative of his agreement with the idea, in spite of his talk of spiritual brotherhood. The use that is often made of the Darwinian slogan of the survival of the fittest in order to rationalize crude aggressiveness, may be significant of the fascist potential within American »naturalism,« although it is supposedly linked to progressive ideals and enlightenment.
5009, a 32-year-old teaching principal in a small California town, who scores high on all scales, rationalizes his belief in a forthcoming war differently:
He expects no warless world and thinks that the next war will be with Russia. »The United States has always ranged itself against dictatorship.«
While he shows the typical high scorers' attitude – psychologically linked to cynicism and contempt for man – of regarding war as unavoidable, he justifies a policy which actually may lead to war with a democratic ideal: the stand to be taken against dictatorships.
A third aspect of subscribing to the war idea comes up in the interview of the aforementioned 5031, a wealthy building contractor. He
feels that perhaps we had better go to war with Russia now and get it over with.
Here the high scorer's typical cynicism, a fusion of contempt for man, exaggerated down-to-earthness, and underlying destructiveness, is allowed uncensored expression. Whereas in the sphere of private morale such psychological urges are held at bay by the acceptance of more or less conventionalized humane standards, they are let loose in the sphere of international politics where there seems to be as little of a collective superego as there is of a truly powerful supranational control agency.
The all-too-ready assumption that war cannot be abolished – which, according to this man, could be hoped for only if military men ran the UNO – is fused with the administrative, quasi-technical, idea that one »should get it over with« as soon as possible, that Russia should be taken care of. War and peace become matters of technological expediency. The political consequence of this way of thinking is self-explanatory.
As with many other political topics, attitude toward Russia, whether for or against, does not by itself differentiate with any sharpness between high and low scorers. There is, first, a kind of »pseudo-low« attitude toward Russia. It falls in line with the general admiration of power in high scorers and is positive only as far as Russian military successes are concerned. It turns into hostility where Russian strength is presented as potentially dangerous. This happens with the San Quentin inmate M 621A, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC. He expresses his true anti-Russian feelings by means of personalization:
(Major problems facing country today?) »I think Russia. ...« (Subject fears a war with Russia sooner or later over the atom bomb.) »Russia wants control of territory in China, so do the United States and England.« (What do you dislike most about Russia?) »Well, a little bit too aggressive. Of course, they've done some wonderful things. Five year plan, educated themselves.« (What good things about Russia?) »Lots of stamina to stand up under hardship.« (Objections?) »I met quite a few Russians. Don't like them, because they seem to be overbearing.« (How do you mean?) »They like to have their own way. ...« (Subject met the Russians he has been exposed to in Shanghai, chiefly Russian merchants.) »They really believe in ›taking‹ you. They are not very clean ... I didn't have any very definite ideas before.«
It may be noted how close this man's attitude toward the Russians comes to certain anti-Semitic stereotypes. However, he has nothing against the Jews; as a matter of fact his wife is Jewish. In this case anti-Russianism may be a phenomenon of displacement.
However, there is also a »genuine« low scorer's negative attitude against Russia, based on aversion to totalitarianism. Here, the Psychiatric Clinic patient M 204, suffering from anxiety neurosis, a moderate socialist and militant pacifist, with low scores on all scales, fits in:
He is a little skeptical about the Soviet Union, disapproving of their totalitarian methods, but being interested in »their interesting experiment.«
Another example is M 310, a liberal of the Extension Testing Class with an unusually low score, assistant manager for an advertising agency, whose criticism touches upon formal democratism while at the same time he is repelled by the oligarchic aspects of Russian government:
(Your understanding of democracy?) »Government of, for, and by the people. Government by majority, directed to its achieving good results for the people. May be a difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, in that sense, may be democracy in Russia. I don't think it necessarily takes our voting system, although I like (democratic voting). ...« (You are critical of Soviet Russia?) »I don't like the concentration of political power in so few hands.«
Sometimes this kind of critique assumes, with low scorers, the aspect of disagreement with American communists because of their wholesale endorsement of Russian politics.
M 203, a teacher, »liberal but not radical,« with low scores on all scales:
»It is good to have intelligent, liberal leadership, rather than radical leadership, which would be bad.« (Example?) »Well, like the communists in this country: they are not intelligent, they are too radical, and there is too much line which is determined by Russia. For instance, Roosevelt was less rigid and learned more by his mistakes.«
It should be noted that this man is an outspoken antifascist who finds it »disgraceful that [Theodor Gilmore] Bilbo should be in Congress.«
As to the pro-Russian attitude found among low scorers, it cannot be overlooked that it has sometimes a somewhat mechanical outlook. Here the element of stereotypy comes clearly to the fore in low scorers. As an example M 713A may serve. He is a young veteran, studying landscape architecture, whose scores are all low.
(How do you feel about Soviet Russia?) »A very wonderful experiment. ... I believe that if left alone will be the greatest power in a few years.« (Disagreement with the communists' line?) »Just in the matter of approach. Their approach is a little too violent, though I can see the reason for that. ... I think we ought to approach it a little more gradually. ... If went into communism would just be like the army. ... Maybe take a hundred years – we are working gradually toward it.«
It is a question whether the idea of a gradual development: is compatible with the theory of dialectical materialism officially accepted in Russia, or whether it is indicative of a dubious element in the subject's appreciation of the »wonderful experiment.« It should be noted that the idea of socialism as an »experiment« stems from the vernacular of middle-class »common sense« and it tends to replace the traditional socialist concept of class struggle with the image of a kind of joint, unanimous venture – as if society as a whole, as it is today, were ready to try socialism regardless of the influence of existing property relations. This pattern of thinking is at least inconsistent with the very same social theory to which our subject seems to subscribe. Anyway, he, like any of our other subjects, goes little into matters of Marxian doctrine or of specific Russian issues, but contents himself with rather a summary positive stand.
And then there is the idea of the »greatest power.« That this idea is not exceptional among low scorers, in other words, that a positive stand toward Russia may have something to do with the Russian successes on the battlefields and in international competition, rather than with the system, is corroborated by the San Quentin inmate M 619, who scores low on E and F but high on PEC, the man who does not believe in any real utopia:
»Well, Russia is undoubtedly one of the most powerful nations in the world today. They've risen to power in the last few years and made more progress than any other country.«
Our general impression concerning our subjects' attitude towards Russia may be summed up as follows. To the vast majority of Americans, the very existence of the Soviet Union constitutes a source of continuous uneasiness. The emergence and survival of a system that has done away with free enterprise seems to them a threat to the basic tenets of the culture of this country, to the »American way,« by the mere fact that it has shattered the belief in liberal economy and liberal political organization as a »natural« eternal phenomenon which excludes any other rational form of society. On the other hand, the success of Russia, particularly her performance during the war, appeals strongly to the American belief that values can be tested by the outcome, by whether they »work« – which is a profoundly liberalistic idea by itself. The way our subjects cope with this inconsistency of evaluation differentiates between high and low scorers. To the former, the Soviet Union, incompatible with their frame of reference, should be done away with as the extreme expression of the »foreign,« of what is also in a psychological sense »strange,« more than anything else. Even the fact that Russia has proved successful in some respects is put into the service of this fantasy: frequently, Russian power is exaggerated, with a highly ambivalent undertone comparable to the stereotypes about »Jewish world power.« To the low scorers Russia is rarely less »strange« – an attitude which has doubtless some basis in reality. But they try to master this sense of strangeness in a different way, by taking an objective attitude of »appreciation,« combining understanding with detachment and a dash of superiority. When they express more outspoken sympathies for the Soviet Union, they do so by implicitly translating Russian phenomena into ideas more familiar to Americans, often by presenting the Russian system as something more harmless and »democratic« than it is, as a kind of pioneering venture somehow reminiscent of our own tradition. Yet indices of a certain inner aloofness are rarely missing. The low scorers' pro-Russian sympathies seem to be of a somewhat indirect nature, either by rigid acceptance of an extraneous »ticket« or by identification based on theoretical thinking and moral reflections rather than on an immediate feeling that this is »my« cause. Their appraisal of Russia frequently assumes an air of hesitant, benevolent expectancy – let us see how they will manage. This contains both an element of authentic rationality and the potential of their swinging against Russia under the cover of handy rationalizations if pressure of public opinion should urge such a change.
5. Communism
The complex, Russia, is closely associated with the complex of communism in the minds of our subjects. This is all the more the case since communism has ceased to be in the public mind an entirely new form of society, based on a complete break in the economic setup, and has become bluntly identified with the Russian government and Russian influence on international politics. Hardly any reference to the basic issue of nationalization of the means of production as a part of the communist program has been found in our sample – a negative result which is significant enough with regard to the historical dynamics to which the concept of communism has been subjected during the last two decades.
Among the high scorers the only feature of the old idea that seems to have survived is the »bogy« of communism. The more the latter concept is emptied of any specific content, the more it is being transformed into a receptacle for all kinds of hostile projections, many of them on an infantile level somehow reminiscent of the presentation of evil forces in comic strips. Practically all features of »high« thinking are absorbed by this imagery. The vagueness of the notion of communism, which makes it an unknown and inscrutable quantity, may even contribute to the negative affects attached to it.
Among the crudest expressions of these feelings is that of our insect toxicologist M 108, by whom the problem of communism is stated in terms of plain ethnocentrism:
(Why is he against communism?) »Well, it is foreign. Socialism, o.k. – you respect a man who is a socialist but a communist comes from a foreign country and he has no business here.«
F 111, who scores high on E, middle on F, and low on PEC, is a young girl who wants to become a diplomat because she is »mad at England and Russia.« Her idea of communism has an involuntarily parodistic ring:
(Political outgroups?) »Fascists and communists. I don't like the totalitarian ideas of the fascists, the centralization of the communists. In Russia nothing is private, everything goes to one man. They have violent ways of doing things.«
To the mind of this woman, the idea of political dictatorship has turned into the bogy of a kind of economic supra-individualism, just as if Stalin claimed ownership of her typewriter.
By a similarly irrational twist another high scorer, M 664B, an uneducated and unintelligent sex offender of the San Quentin group, with high scores on all scales, simply associates communism with the danger of war:
»If labor keeps getting more power, we'll be like Russia. That's what causes wars.«
The complete irrationality, not to say idiocy, of the last three examples shows what vast psychological resources fascist propaganda can rely on when denouncing a more or less imaginary communism without taking the trouble to discuss any real political or economic issues.
If representatives of this attitude enter upon any argumentation at all, it is, the last examples indicate, centered in the facile, though not completely spurious identification of communism and fascism which displaces hostility against the defeated enemy upon the foe to be.
Low scorers are not immune in this respect. Thus the low-scoring student-minister M 910 is of the following opinion:
(How do you feel about Russia's government?) »I think there is very little difference between fascism and communism as it's practiced in Russia. The 1936 Constitution is a marvelous document. I think it's five hundred years ahead of our Constitution because it guarantees social rights instead of individual rights but when man hasn't any rights except as a member of the Communist Party. ... I think it's capitalistic. ...« (What is the nature of your objections to Russia?) »Well, first of all, I think it was Russia that carried the ball in entering this veto power into the UNO which I think will be the death of the thing right now. ... Russia has got the things right where she wants them. We think we're the leaders but we fool ourselves. ...« (Subject objects strongly to deceitful diplomacy.)
High scorers who make less intellectual effort simply find communism not individualistic enough. The standard phraseology they employ contrasts nicely with the belief in spiritual independence which they profess. We quote as an example F 106, a high scorer of the Public Speaking Class group, a young teacher:
(Political outgroups?) »Communists have some good ideas but I don't think too much of them. They don't give the individuals enough mind of their own.«
Sometimes the identification of communism and fascism is accompanied by paranoid twists in the Elders of Zion style. M 345, our radar field engineer:
(What do you think of the P.A.C.?) »Never found any definite information on the C.I.O. ... but ... C.I.O. seems the agency to turn international, certainly has got all the earmarks, not because of being labor union, but just because of the way they compare.« (Subject compares communism to Hitler in Mein Kampf, telling exactly what he planned to do and how, and then doing it.) »C.I.O. has followed the lines of action very similar to pronounced policies of Comintern – even their name, Congress for Industrial Workers; not much faith in the communists succeeding. Their aim is tight little control of their own group.«
The mix-up of Comintern, CIO, and Mein Kampf is the appropriate climate for panic, and subsequent violent action.
But this climate by no means prevails. There is one quite frequently noted way of dealing with the problem of communism which safeguards the aspects of detached objectivity while allowing for good-natured rejection. It reminds one of the story of the boy who, when offered some very sour dish and asked whether he liked it answered: »Excellent – when I'll be grown up.« Communism is a good thing for the others, particularly for »those foreigners,« from whom it has been imported anyway. This technique is employed by both high and low scorers. 5008, the liberal-minded Jefferson descendant:
»The communists may be able to do something in the Soviet Union, but they would utterly fail here.«
In M 115, the low-scoring fraternity man, the argument has a noticeable taint of contempt for the have-nots. This is the man who wants »none of this Marxian stuff.«
»... but in poorer countries, like in Russia, Germany, etc., it's necessary in some modified form; but not in America. We have too much here already, that is we are too developed already.«
The subject is not struck by the idea that a collectivistic economy might be easier in an industrially highly advanced, mature country, rather than more difficult. To him, communism is simply identified with enhancement of material productive powers through more efficient organization. He seems to be afraid of overproduction as if this concept would still make sense in an economy no longer dependent upon the contingencies of the market.
Even the extreme low scorer M 1206a, of the Maritime School group, who believes that America will eventually become a socialistic country,
thinks that Russia has a wonderful system of government – for Russia – »though I don't think we could transplant its system to this country ... though we should watch her and get ideas to build our own country better.«
In this case the argument is mitigated by an element of thoughtfulness which is an accordance with the stand taken by this subject with regard to the Communist Party in this country;
»Well, I don't know a great deal about it. I believe that if a man wants to be a communist, that's not only his privilege, but his duty ... to try and convince as many people as he can. ...« Subject objects vigorously to red-baiting tactics. ... »I think that Russia will be the most democratic country in the world in time. ... Joe has been a little ruthless at times, but. ...«
Sometimes the argument is fused with the idea that socialism would not be »practical,« for purely economic reasons which are mostly taken from the very sphere of a profit system which is supposed to be replaced under socialism by an economic organization moulded after the needs of the population. F 359, the previously (pp. [280, 381]) quoted high-scoring accountant in a government department:
Subject thinks that communism is all right for Russia, but not for this country, although the trend seems to be more and more that way. She believes in private ownership of property and the private enterprise system. She considers it more efficient. She is not so sure about government ownership of public utilities such as water, etc. She thinks that they probably operate better under private ownership, that the costs are lower.
The interviews of other subjects show an unmistakably condescending overtone of this same argument, such as M 107, a medical student who scores high on E but middle on F and PEC:
»We can cooperate with Russia; if they want communism they have to have it.«
This type of liberal approach, of which, incidentally, the Hitler regime profited during the whole Chamberlain era of noninterference, is not as broad-minded as it may appear. It often hides the conviction that there is no objective truth in politics, that every country, as every individual, may behave as it likes and that the only thing that counts is success. It is precisely this pragmatization of politics which ultimately defines fascist philosophy.
Obviously, the relationship between anticommunism and fascist potential as measured by our scales should not be oversimplified. In some of our earlier studies the correlation between anti-Semitism and anticommunism was very high,22 but there is reason to believe that it would not be so high today, not, at least, at the surface level. During the last several years all the propaganda machinery of the country has been devoted to promoting anticommunist feeling in the sense of an irrational »scare« and there are probably not many people, except followers of the »party line,« who have been able to resist the incessant ideological pressure. At the same time, during the past two or three years it may have become more »conventional« to be overtly opposed to anti-Semitism, if the large number of magazine articles, books, and films with wide circulation can be regarded as symptomatic of a trend. The underlying character structure has little bearing on such fluctuations. If they could be ascertained, they would demonstrate the extreme importance of propaganda in political matters. Propaganda, when directed to the antidemocratic potential in the people, determines to a large extent the choice of the social objects of psychological aggressiveness.
Fußnoten
[1 Daniel J. Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism,« The Authoritarian Personality, pp. 151–207.]
2 Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism.«
3 After completion of the study, the writer of this chapter became acquainted with the pertinent article by Ralph H. Gundlach, »Confusion among Undergraduates in Political and Economic Ideas,« Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 32 (1937), pp. 357–367.
4 This has been pointed out with regard to the imagery of the Jews. See Chapter XVI [above, pp. 265ff.].
[5 See below, pp. 454ff.]
[6 See above, pp. 185ff.]
[7 See above, p. 287.]
[8 See above, pp. 207ff.]
[9 Levinson, »Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism.«
10 Personalization, as indicated by these sentences, has an obvious fascist potential. It enhances the individual as against any objective anonymous system of checks and balances, against democratic control. Behind the adulation of the »great man« looms, in the present situation, the readiness to »follow the leader.«]
11 This case is described in detail in Chapter XXI under the name of »Ronald.« [William R. Morrow, »Criminality and Antidemocratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates,« The Authoritarian Personality, pp. 817–890.]
[12 The Authoritarian Personality, pp. 291–486.]
[13 See above, p. 330.]
14 The role played by shady pseudo-medicine in Nazi Germany is sociologically linked to the ascendance of déclassé intellectuals under National Socialism, psychologically to the paranoid twist of Nazi ideology as well as of the personalities of many leaders. There is a direct interconnection between the doctrine of »purity of blood« and the glorification of sundry purifiers of the body. The first academic chair created by Hitler was one for »natural healing.« His own physician was a quack, Himmler's a chiropractor, and Rudolf Hess encouraged all kinds of superstitious approaches to medicine. It should be noted that analogous tendencies make themselves felt in the American »lunatic fringe.« One of our native crackpot agitators combines Jew-baiting with a »health food« campaign, directed against the delikatessen which are not only denounced as being Jewish but also as unwholesome. The imagery of Jewish food throughout the fascist ideology deserves careful examination.
[15 Else Frenkel-Brunswik, »Parents and Childhood as Seen through the Interviews,« Chapter X, The Authoritarian Personality.]
16 Cf. Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1945), pp. 418–420.
[17 R. Nevitt Sanford, »The Contrasting Ideologies of Two College Men: A Preliminary View,« Chapter II, The Authoritarian Personality.]
18 This observation is in accordance with experience in Nazi Germany where all kinds of criticism and jokes about the party hierarchy were whispered everywhere, whilst Hitler seems to have been largely exempted from this kind of criticism. One heard frequently the remark: »The Führer does not know about these things« – even when concentration camps were concerned.
19 R. Nevitt Sanford, Herbert S. Conrad and Kate Franck, »Psychological Determinants of Optimism regarding the Consequences of the War,« The Journal of Psychology 22 (1946), pp. 207–235.
[20 See below, pp. 481ff.]
[21 Daniel J. Levinson, »Projective Questions in the Study of Personality and Ideology,« Chapter XV, The Authoritarian Personality.]
22 Cf. Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, »A Scale for the Measurement of Anti-Semitism,« The Journal of Psychology 17 (1944), pp. 339–370.