Section II:

 

Thomas' Method

Introductory Remarks

 

A survey of the method used by Thomas in handling his audience, apart from the personal element previously analysed, is important not only because his methods are common to fascist and anti-Semitic agitators whose actual doctrines widely differ, but also for a more specific reason. With Thomas as with most of his kin, the method, the »how,« is more important than the contents, the »what.« His actual interest is the manipulation of men, their transformation into adherents of his organization, and in the last analysis everything serves this purpose. The specific ideas and postulates serve merely as bait and have very little objective weight. Partly, he is too cautious to reveal his real aims. Partly, he presupposes, probably correctly, that the audience understands what he actually advocates, that is, jingoist violence, much better when he deals with political goals in a less explicit way. He obeys an old German chauvinistic rule of the thumb: Immer daran denken, nie davon reden. Partly, the goals themselves are vague and inarticulate and will have to be adapted to changing political situations, as soon as the fascist feels himself in command of power. Partly, his followers should not know too exactly what is intended, his political program, for they might discover the blatant discrepancy between their own most primitive interests and the interests which they are called upon to serve. Thus, the emphasis is shifted from the »what« to the »how.« Thomas is an advertising expert in a highly specialized field, that of the transformation of religious bigotry into political and racial hatred. He gives much more attention to his advertising techniques than to the ideas which he tries to sell. The psychological stimuli he provides, and the response mechanism on which he reckons, are carefully worked out; his platforms, on the other hand, are either vague and abstract or childish and absurd, and so one has every reason to believe that he knows very well why he devotes more attention to psychological techniques than to concrete political issues. The latter, conversely, enter the picture only on a very down-to-earth, atheoretical level, in terms of election campaigns and scandal mongering, and hence reveal little about his final ends.

In objective terms, Thomas' radio speeches are quite illogical. There is no clear-cut and transparent relationship between premises and inferences, causes and effects, data and concepts. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute this lack of discursive logic to a lack of intellectual capacity. Thomas is a shrewd man. The lack of objective logic in his statements is due to quite logical reflections about the psychology of his listeners and the best way to reach them; and some of his apparently most illogical devices are certainly the result of hard thinking and long experience, although a certain affinity between the speaker's mind and the supposed muddle-headedness of his listeners should not be discounted. As a whole, however, Thomas' radio speeches offer an excellent example for one of the basic characteristics of fascist and anti-Semitic propaganda, namely, the entirely calculated, highly rationalistic nature of its irrationalism, not only with regard to the irrational philosophy that it implies, but also to its irrational effect. Thomas' method may be adequately described as »emotional planning.« This is demonstrated first of all by the general strategy of his speeches. They fall into two totally distinct divisions, the »esoteric« and the »exoteric.«¹ The esoteric ones are those which were not broadcast, particularly those delivered in Trinity Auditorium. They were addressed to the nucleus of his followers, the people to whom he could speak his mind and whom he could whip up to the peak of emotional hatred. Here alone his anti-Semitic propaganda went unchecked, and it is these speeches which provide the key for certain passages of the radio addresses which, subject to the control of the stations and of public opinion, are soft-pedalled and avoid abusive statements in most cases. Their function is to attract people who could be incorporated into his organization and, of course, to secure money. These exoteric speeches, to the study of which we confine ourselves here, are largely to be interpreted as advertising for the non-public, esoteric activities. These exoteric speeches are carefully balanced. Whenever Thomas dared a violent political attack, he became mild and harmless in the next utterance; very often speeches which deal at least in part with political matters are followed by ones of an apparently purely religious nature. He follows, purposely or automatically, the Hitlerian »wave technique« described by Edmond Taylor.² He is always cautious enough to keep open the road for retreat and could even counterbalance his anti-Semitic statements by appeals to Gentiles and Jews alike in the Coughlin manner. As a whole, his speeches may show a certain crescendo in violence and aggressiveness, due to the increasing scope of his »crusade.« This crescendo, however, is interrupted whenever he meets any difficulties with public agencies, and it would be hard to gauge it exactly. By and large, his radio speeches belong to the realm of indirect, semi-hidden, fascist and anti-Semitic propaganda and most of his techniques can be traced back to his endeavour to excite hatred and violence without committing himself. In this respect he is different from many other anti-Semitic agitators, such as [William Dudley] Pelley. However, he is shrewd enough to use even his cautious avoidance of definite commitments as a peculiar kind of threat. Here he is doubtlessly influenced by Nazi propaganda which always sounded most dangerous when it stressed the »strict legality« of its methods and ends.

»Movement« trick

 

The vagueness of Thomas' statements about his political objectives cannot be shown by quotation since it is a negative aspect of his utterances. He defines his aim as something like the concern for the Holiness of God and an ensuing »regeneration« of the world. (The idea of regeneration with the implication of hatred for the »degenerate ones« is common to all anti-Semites since Gobineau and Chamberlain.) The vagueness of this aim itself, however, is shrewdly utilized. The trick consists of substituting the concept of the movement itself for the aim of the movement, an aim that is purposely left vague. The description of the »revival« that he expects has always something redundant, lacking any definite application.

 

My friend, there is not but one way to get a revival and all America has got to get that revival ... all of the churches. The story of the great Welsh revival is simply this. Men became desperate for the holiness of God in the world, and they began to pray, and they began to ask God to send a revival (!), and wherever men and women went the revival was on. It was not confined to one church, one area. When men and women came into the outdoors, a great something gripped them to know God. They began to cry out to God, to save their souls.³

 

This description of older revivalist meetings may not be altogether wrong; they consisted in collective imitation, a sort of contagion of ecstasy, rather than in being overwhelmed by any concrete, specific idea. Revival is not a revival for something; it is rather an end in itself, and it is hardly accidental that Thomas describes the Welsh revival as nothing but a universal desire for a revival. This is transferred to Thomas' own political racket. The movement is conceived of as an end in itself, like the Nazis who always made a fetish of the term Bewegung without pointing out exactly where the Bewegung was going. »This great movement,« the glorification of action, of something going on, both obliterates and replaces the purpose of the movement; Thomas becomes very concrete only when dealing with matters of organization and money, or with his adversaries and the danger that is supposed to threaten, but never with regard to any positive idea. This configuration may point to some of the deepest psychological implications of the stimuli that he exhibits to his audience. He wants to evince an »against« rather than a »for« attitude, and the gratification which he psychologically promises by his total approach is, in the last analysis, the pogrom rather than the achievement of any aim apart from such an outbreak. The movement is presented as a value per se, because it is understood that movement implies violence, oppression of the weak, and exhibition of one's own power. Since the goal is finally the subjugation of one's own followers, they should be distracted from this goal, and their ambition should be centered around the pleasure which the movement itself may yield, not around the ideas which it might possibly materialize. The shift of the emphasis from end to means is one of the axioms of the logic of fascist manipulation. The end is »that we might demonstrate to the world that there are patriots, God-fearing Christian men and women who are yet willing to give their lives for the cause of God, home and native land.«⁴ These words, by association, ring like those of the Ku Klux Klan, nativism, and Chauvinism, that is to say, they bear some definite destructive connotations, but remain quite vague apart from such associations. The transformation of means into an end is blatant: »To give their lives for the cause of God« is a means and the end would be only that cause which is never stated concretely. The negative concept of sacrifice remains the last end Thomas has to offer. The means by which it is supposed to be achieved are the Christian American Crusade, its paper, the pamphlets, the money for which Thomas asks. All the weight of his propaganda is thrown in to promote the means. Propaganda is the ultimate content of this propaganda.

»Flight-of-ideas« technique

 

The lack of any program or goal makes itself felt in the logical structure of Thomas' speeches. Since he has nothing to prove, since no real conclusion is ever to be reached by an analysis of given material, no actual argumentation takes place at all. Yet, Thomas is American enough to reckon with the common sense of his listeners, and he therefore upholds the form of rational thinking, corroborating his theses by examples and apparently making deductions. The inferences, however, are as spurious as the examples. The logical trick consists of the fact that he always takes for granted that his so-called »conclusions« are the pre-existing convictions of every true Christian American. While apparently proving something, he actually only wants to corroborate those common prejudices which agree with his plan. Everything is decided before the argument starts. In his confused ideas there is a sort of totalitarian order. Everything is settled. One knows what is good and bad, which powers are the powers of Christian tradition, family, and native soil, and which are those of baseness, degeneration, and world Bolshevism. No problem exists, no adversary is refuted, no thesis is rationally justified. The logical process merely consists of identification, or rather of pigeonholing. The whole set of values, including even the most doubtful ones, is regarded as pre-established, and the orator's effort is spent entirely in identifying any group, person, race, denomination, or whatever it may be, with one of the rigid concepts of his frame of reference. Even in this process of identification Thomas never takes the trouble to actually prove that any phenomenon belongs rightly to any of those pseudo-logical classes. He feeds upon the bias connected with the phenomenon and expands it by subsuming it under some high-sounding category, such as the forces of evil, the Pharisees, or the Battle of Armageddon. Argumentation has been replaced by the device, termed in the book on Coughlin by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis the »name-calling device.«^[5] This is grounded not only in the weakness of fascist reasoning itself, which, from the viewpoint of its profiteers, is reasonable enough. It is rather based upon a cynical contempt for the audience's capacity to think – a contempt overtly expressed by Hitler. Thomas reckons with an audience who cannot think, that is to say, who is too weak to maintain a continuous process of making deductions. They are supposed to live intellectually from moment to moment, as it were, and to react to isolated, logically unconnected statements, rather than to any consistent structure of thought. They know what they want and what they do not want, but they cannot detach themselves from their own immediate and atomistic reactions. It is one of the main tricks of Thomas to dignify this atomistic thinking as a kind of intellectual process. By reproducing in his speeches the vagueness of a thinking process confined to mere associations, a »monologue intérieure,« Thomas provides a good intellectual conscience for those who cannot think. He cunningly substitutes a »paranoic« scheme for a rational process.

The most important device of his logic of manipulation is his technique of associational transitions. Whether he chooses this technique deliberately or whether it flows simply from orational habits, its essence is to connect different sentences, or ideas, not by any logical operation, but simply by some element which they have in common and which makes them appear connected in spite of possibly complete logical disparity. A typical argument which recurs most frequently in various forms runs as follows:

 

Christ says, »by their fruits ye shall know them,« now, that is the only way that I have of testing whether a man or woman belongs to God, it is what you do. My friend, one of the best things in the world that you can do to demonstrate that you are a child of God-work on your neighbor; send for all of this vital literature.⁶

 

The trick is played by the double meaning of the word »neighbor« which serves as associational link. The word »neighbor« plays a definite role in Christian theological language, and the idea that »by their fruits ye shall know them« is generally interpreted as that of doing good works towards one's »neighbor.« On the other hand, the word »neighbor« has a plain realistic meaning, referring to the man next door, that is to say, the acquaintance to whom Thomas wants his follower to direct his house-to-house propaganda. The follower should send for »this vital literature« in order to »start a chain, contact your neighbors, have them contact five more people, and keep the chain going«⁷ – the notorious chain-letter device, that has certain mischievous connotations in itself. The associational technique consists in bringing closely together the idea of good works and of asking for Thomas' printed pamphlets. In reality, there is no connection between the pamphlets and theological or moral truth; by the word »neighbor« they are wedded to each other.

Another example shows an even more arbitrary connection of ideas:

 

You know, I see, this morning, yonder on the bleak New England shore, I see that Mayflower, and a little group of men and women, after they have spent three months upon that great uncharted sea, and here is what they are saying: listen to that historic Mayflower compact »in the name of God.« You call upon that same God that our fathers called upon, and you call upon the same God to guide us through the storms that we are now moving through, and you also remember, my friend, that the Christian American Crusade cannot possibly go another forty-eight hours unless you, through the power of the Holy Spirit shall make a real sacrificial offering. I cannot possibly go further, my friend, unless I receive during the next twenty-four to thirty-eight hours sufficient money to run this.⁸

 

The main link is the identical name for something real and something metaphorical. The Mayflower went through real storms; Thomas' racket goes through a financial crisis. Calling the latter a storm, he links his movement to the voyage of the Mayflower and borrows from the prestige of that established American legend. Moreover, the Pilgrim Fathers were religious. So are his followers supposed to be, and religion means sacrifice. Hence, they are called in the name of the Mayflower to send him money.

A last example: »As we know Christ, we enter in, and we go out. We find pastures. Our God provides a pasture for his sheep. That is the reason this message is going out, today, for it is food for the spiritual lives.«⁹ Here the associative link is completely formalistic. A central agency sends out identical material simultaneously to innumerable individuals. In the one case it is supposed to be God who spiritually nourished his children; in the other case it is Mr. Thomas who speaks over the radio. The implication of the trick is that by associative transition the message of Thomas is dressed up as a message of God in person – an idea which is helped by the theological language that he constantly employs. It should be noted that this device is closely akin to what is called the »transfer« device in the above-mentioned Coughlin analysis. But the trick implies more than the idea of borrowing prestige from something established and transferring it to something apocryphal and even shabby. Its ultimate aim is probably not so much the selling of a false argumentation as, indeed, the complete breakdown of a logical sense within the listeners and eventually the collapse of any meaning that the idea of truth may have for them. They are trained to accept oratorical expectoration, backed by all the authority which is implied in the attitude of any speaker who addresses a mass, as a sort of command. They are to give up the element of resistance that is implied in any act of responsible thinking as such. They are to follow the leader first intellectually, and finally in person through thick and thin. We may add that this device as well as practically all the others discussed in this study are used hundreds and hundreds of times throughout Thomas' speeches so that they become a kind of a pattern and have a greater chance of being accepted, since they are employed as an established form of intellectual procedure. He has a »style of thinking,« the consistency of which throughout its repetition hides the inner inconsistency of each case.

»Listen to your leader«

 

It is a truism that authoritarian propaganda does everything to establish authoritarian ideas. This, taken in isolation, however, is not a specific characteristic of fascism. Other ideologies, particularly religious and feudal-conservative ones, have always dwelt on the concept of authority. The new element in propagating authority is that anti-democratism can no longer refer to authorities which are regarded either as being guaranteed by supernatural revelation, such as the Church, or as being grounded in an omnipresent tradition, such as the »legitimistic« idea of feudal authority and, to a certain extent, even of monarchism. Modern authoritarianism has to face an issue which first came into the open in the period of French Restoration, in the writings of reactionaries, such as Bonald and de Maistre. Throughout modern society the problem is conspicuously manifested. The fascist must try to justify authoritarianism which is an inherent tendency of modern industrial organization. Yet he must face ways of thought which are essentially opposed to authority itself, and must confront those very masses which are to be subdued by authority. This task, essentially insoluble, calls for certain twists and distortions if it is to be undertaken with any chance of success.

Most of the techniques of rationalistically and »democratically« defending blind authority are hackneyed and have often been exposed. Typical is the »transfer« device described in the Coughlin study of the Institute of Propaganda Analysis,^[10] a device which consists of transferring the established popular authority of a faith, an idea, or a person to the thesis which the fascist wants to invest with the halo of authority. Or we may mention the equally well-known »Bandwagon« device, which aims at luring people to join one's movement by pretending that a vast number of other people already have done so. We shall not once more describe these devices which are incessantly employed by Thomas.¹¹ Rather, we confine ourselves to discussing some tricks which have not yet been fully recognized, and to considering the broader psychological background of modern fake authority as such.

The most characteristic means of propagandistically establishing authority in a quasi-rational way, without taking resort to traditionally accepted institutions, consists of taking up an authoritarian term and making it a sort of fetish. This device has been noted by Dr. A. Sanders¹² under the heading of »magic words.« The best example for this device is the personification of totalitarian regimes everywhere, by a Duce, a Führer, or, with Martin Luther Thomas, a leader.¹³ The term leader itself is very significant in this respect. It expresses a claim of unquestioned authority, the claim that the leader should be »followed« without referring to any traditional dynastic title. Hitler's propagandistic instinct in this respect is so outspoken that he did not even assume the title of Reichspräsident after Hindenburg's death in 1934. Hitler called himself the leader of the whole of the German people. The leader is he who ought to be obeyed blindly and only for the sake of his own merits, which are supposed to be self-evident and appreciated by all. His psychological status is paradoxical: It combines irrational devotion on the part of his followers with the rationality that he is actually best equipped to do the job and that the followers should recognize him as best. Here, no doubt, the model of the military officer has been transferred to the realm of politics and emancipated from any idea of expertness and organized control. The Führer is per se the officer against whose decisions no objection is possible. The term leader expresses its emancipation by becoming absolute.

Current opinion about fascism would object that the concept of the leader, taken as an absolute, is entirely irrational and in no way different from any other magical idolatry of human beings. This idea is furthered by legalistic Nazi constructions such as that of the charisma of the Führer. While the ultimate irrationality and arbitrariness of the leader idea, however, is indisputable, one would oversimplify things and therewith make them too harmless by immediately referring to this ultimate irrationality and thus dismissing the whole leader ideology as pure nonsense. Two facts are to be borne in mind. First, the concentration of economic power in certain nations has reached such a level that those who hold such power actually exercise what amounts to absolute authority within a »rational« industrial society. Second, the potential strength of the underlying population makes itself felt insofar as the authoritarian leaders are compelled to justify their usefulness in some way to those whom they command. This state of affairs leads to the paradoxical construction of the Führer as an absolute yet somehow »responsible« authority. The social conflict that stands behind this construction and, as it were, calls for it, invests the Führer principle with an inner strength which is comparatively immune with regard to its inherent logical inconsistencies.

The idolatry of the term leader itself is not simply a relapse into barbarian habits of thought, though it doubtlessly implies retrogressive elements. It is in itself the outcome of late industrial society in a way which at least may be hinted at. The intermediary between industrial rationality and magical idolatry is advertising. The technique of competition has developed a certain tendency to turn the slogans under which the commodities are sold into magical ones. Such magic of the words is promoted by incessant and omnipresent repetition which is planned rationally but blunts the conscious discrimination of the prospective customers. An important element in this process is that the customers feel the tremendous power concentrated behind the ever-repeated words and therefore display a certain psychological readiness to obey. This obedience tends to a certain extent to sever the link between the customers' own interest and the actual usefulness of the commodity. They come to attribute to the product a certain value per se, a certain fetish character. This mechanism has become so automatized throughout the buying processes of modern life that it can easily be transferred by simple advertising techniques to the political field. The mode of »selling an idea« is not essentially different from the mode of selling a soap or a soft drink. Sociopsychologically, the magical character of the word leader and therewith the charisma of the Führer is nothing but the spell of commercial slogans taken over by the agencies of immediate political power.

Thomas' speeches contain a striking example of the process of severing the concept of the Führer from any rational context and making it an absolute, a fetish. It matters little who the leaders are. Leadership as such is an ideal, and a man who speaks with authority should be followed. Thomas says in one of his isolationist ventures:

 

You take Harry Carr in the Los Angeles Times, today. You read what he has to say on the first page. We are living in a tremendous hour, when a great world war is immanent. It is here, he says. He speaks of the fact of China being swallowed and being taken over by Japan. He says if America so much as raises a finger in protest, it means war. If Britain so much as raises a finger in protest, it means war. He tells us that Japan by her action in taking over Northern China has served notice to the world that the Orient is through, so far as the rule of the white man is concerned. Why does not the world listen to these men? If they won't listen to Christ and the Bible, why don't they listen to their leaders?¹⁴

 

The last passage is a very significant slip of the tongue. He implicitly admits that religious authority has passed away and silently transfers the authority to today's »leaders.« Those who hold power are regarded as rightful heirs to divine and absolute authority, precisely and only because they are »leaders,« because they hold power. This is the point where the ultimate irrationality of the leader idea becomes blatant. Counterpropaganda should dwell upon this point by elaborating that fascism justifies leadership by nothing but leadership, that admiration of power is more important in the fascist setup than anything else, particularly than its supposed nationalism (a fact that becomes very clear in the last quotation from Thomas), and finally that not only those who fulfill the deified function of the leader but also, correspondingly, the enemies, are interchangeable: the same isolationist groups for whom Thomas spoke in 1935 and who at that time took an implicitly pro-Japanese stand are those who today want the whole war effort to be shifted against Japan, now regarded as the arch enemy.

In some passages Thomas shows more concretely his conception of the leader. It resembles very clearly that of the Nordic, Nazi type with poise, »Haltung.« It suggests certain virile or quasi-heroic qualities, especially the absence of mercy, through metaphors so strongly evoking the idea of archaic prowess that they contradict the idea of Christian compassion, though Thomas' image of the leader is supposed to appeal to some sort of Christian elite:

 

I am looking for men who have the courage of their convictions. I am looking for women who have the courage of their convictions. I am looking for young life, young Americans, thank God, with clear eyes and clear principles. Young men, stalwart Americans, I am looking for young women who see straight and think straight, and, thank God, are willing to act straight, who are not afraid to advance their opinions, who are not afraid to say yes, I would die for the old flag of my nation, who are not unwilling to take their place in the firing line and defend by their lives, yes by their lifeblood, if necessary, this great institution.¹⁵

 

Apart from being a leader, the leader has to be a warrior, ready to fight and die. This readiness is praised as a quality in itself, independent of any specific contents for which one has to die, and is linked up with a very general notion of »this great institution.«

Excursus on »fait accompli« technique

 

It appears to us that such well-known devices as that of psychologically transferring the idea of established authority to one's own racket, or the band wagon appeal – »two million customers cannot be wrong« – as well as making into fetishes certain words, such as »leader,« are but special cases of a much broader pattern underlying all fascist propaganda, at least in this country. It may be called the »fait accompli« technique. It consists of presenting an issue as one that previously has been decided. The foregone decision is attributed either to the masses who back the speaker's stand, or to the personal and institutional authority on whose prestige he draws, or at least to a clear-cut superiority in the realm of ideas which has simply to be translated into practical, technical terms. Some obvious reasons for this technique lie at hand. On the one hand, it calls for less independence and moral courage to join the party that is already winning. This advantage counts heavily in a situation where the propagandist has to reckon with vast numbers of people who are unwilling to take any real risks, since they live under conditions which make them thoroughly dependent on the stronger ones. On the other hand, belief that the causes have already been decided tends to render any resistance psychologically a hopeless undertaking. The terrorising effect is enhanced by the fact that all fascism involves numerus clausus and elite ideas, so that those who come too late have serious reasons to fear disadvantage when the fascist regime is established.¹⁶ They join the band wagon because they do not want to miss the bus.

Of course, the »fait accompli« technique, which in many cases assumes silly and fraudulent forms, could hardly work unless it had some basis in reality as well as in the psychology of the people. As to the former, it is true that the present organization of economy actually tends to make people to a very large extent objects of processes which they often fail to understand and which are utterly beyond their control. The dwindling of economic free enterprise and initiative makes life appear to most people as something that happens to them rather than as something which they determine by their own free will. To most people their life actually is decided in advance. As soon as there appears an organization which evokes the idea of some strong backing by the powers that be, and which promises something to its followers, great numbers may be willing to transform their vague awareness of being mere objects into adherence to such a movement. Thus they may turn the hateful idea of being thoroughly dependent into an asset, namely, into the belief that by giving up their own will they join the very institution whose victory is predetermined. The »fait accompli« technique thus touches upon one of the central mechanisms of the mass psychology of fascism: the transformation of the feeling of one's own impotence into a feeling of strength. The feeling of impotence is represented by the idea that the issue already has been decided without one's having had any say in it; but acknowledgment of this very fact, by »going over« to the established victor, mysteriously and irrationally changes the feeling of impotence into one of power. It is probably the most important task of counterpropaganda to interfere with this mechanism and to demonstrate strikingly to the masses that the mere acknowledgment of impotence, the mere giving up of oneself, by no means entails actual strength and social reward. The manipulation of this whole mechanism, by the way, is by no means limited to fascist propaganda, but is set in motion throughout modern mass culture, particularly in the cinema. A fascist propagandist utilizing this mechanism can rely on processes which to a certain extern have been already automatized. Under this viewpoint even the apparently most harmless movie comedian may unconsciously serve the most sinister purposes of domination.

However, involved in that mechanism there seems to be an element which pertains to even deeper psychological processes, and which may set the stage for the more obvious effects. Here, we can hint at it only in rather general terms. We mean the widespread tendency of present society to accept and even to adore the existent – that which is anyway. The processes of enlightenment, the spirit of positivism in its broadest sense, have destroyed magical and »supernatural« ideas by confrontation with empirical reality, with that which exists. In America in particular the conviction prevails that truth is only that which can be verified be referring to facts. Throughout the modern history of the mind, the concept of the factual itself has proved to be stronger than any metaphysical entity. This historical superiority is one of many other factors. We mentioned here only the survival of magical psychological traits after the abolition of metaphysical ideas, the tremendous power over the individual, of today's highly organized social existence, and the ultimate opaqueness and even irrationality of the existent order itself. All this has tended to invest the factual itself with that very halo against which the idea of fact was originally coined. One may go so far as to say that religion largely and unconsciously has been replaced by a very abstract yet tremendously powerful cult of the existent. That something exists is taken as a proof that it is stronger than that which does not exist, and that therefore it is better. One can hardly overrate the extent to which what may be called philosophical Darwinism has permeated every channel of modern psychology. The »fait accompli« technique exploits this disposition. By investing anything that is propagated or desired with the quality of existence, this device tends to make it an object of adoration in a sense similar to that in which half-grown boys adore motor cars or airplanes. This adoration of the existent becomes stronger, the more the existent itself is presented in terms of technical rationality and practicability. Insight into these possibilities, as will be seen later, is fully utilized by Thomas. The idea that existence is largely taken as its own justification leads back to the point of departure of our discussion of the leader device, namely, that the term leader as such, void of any justification, be it rational or traditional, is accepted and glorified. When Thomas asks the astonishingly general question »why people don't follow their leaders« the basic assumption behind his cult of the leader is not only, as we pointed out, that power authorizes the leader but probably that even the mere existence of leadership as such, warranted through history, is a sufficient legitimation for the existence of leaders. At this point fascist propaganda is profoundly interconnected with basic trends of modern cultural anthropology. It may be added that it can be fought with more than ephemeral success only if the magification [sic] of the existent is finally overcome at its foundation in our present setup. The irrationality of the fascist's delight in the »accomplished fact« idea in general, and in that of established leadership in particular, is but the last consequence of the common sense idea that nothing succeeds like success. The absurdity of fascism can be exploded only if the apparent reasonableness of such ideas is exploded, too.

As far as Thomas is concerned, the »fait accompli« technique, apart from his crude application of the »band wagon,« the »transfer« and similar devices, comes to the fore in the configurations of his language rather than in the contents of his arguments. His movement was, after all, too limited to allow for large scale »fait accompli« propaganda, such as the Nazis used between 1930 and 1933. Conversely, the expression of the »fait accompli« idea by mere linguistic forms rather than by disputable assertions about already achieved successes may be less subject to rational control, and therewith more effective. We mention some of the most typical and ever recurring »fait accompli« formulas of Thomas' language. He generally speaks of his »crusade« as »this movement,« »the great movement,« »this thing,« as if it were well known to his listeners. He takes it for granted, as it were, treating it as a well established institution, thus relieving himself of the necessity of ever concretely stating what it actually proposes. The threatening and sinister undertone of the term »this movement« should not be overheard. It is so awe inspiring that it cannot even be called by its name. Similarly, Thomas always refers to his pamphlets as »this vital literature.« His newspaper, the »Christian American Crusader,« is called the »official« newspaper of his movement. This has a double implication. On the one hand, it is suggested that some unauthorized people, perhaps »those sinister forces« or some competitive group, may illegitimately speak for the »crusade« whereas only his paper is the real McCoy and anything else a cheap imitation – an idea obviously borrowed from commercial advertising. On the other hand, the term »official newspaper« conveys the idea that the newspaper and the organization behind it have legitimate, and possibly even governmental authority. In other words, the final aim, the seizure of power, is psychologically hinted at as something largely accomplished. All fascist movements have a tendency to represent themselves as authority supplementary to and opposed to the actual government, as valid organizations supplementary to the still prevailing organization of society, ready to replace the latter at any given time. There is an uninterrupted chain of ideas from the »official« newspaper of a small political racket to the huge para-military organizations, to wit, the private armies of the Nazis before 1933. The American term »self-styled« or »self-appointed« authority very clearly delineates this device. It is significant, however, that it had to be characterized by a standard term. The trick to make particularistic or private undertakings appear as public, established institutions has become an institution itself. This may well indicate how deeply rooted in modern society is the tendency towards self-appointed officialdom.

»Unity« trick

 

In Germany one of the most successful Nazi slogans was that directed against the supposedly innumerable parties. Inner disunity was made responsible for the crises of the Weimar Republic, particularly for its inability to build up a sound parliamentary majority during its last years. This German device proved effective even abroad. It was said often in this country that a democracy with twenty or thirty parliamentary parties could not possibly operate. From the very beginning the whole concept was based upon a lie. Most of the supposedly pernicious parties never played any decisive role, and the number of those which were of any importance was never greater than six or seven. In this country in spite of its age-old and thoroughly established two-party system it is interesting to note that this trick and the appeal for unity as a cloak for totalitarian repressive comprehensiveness is also to be heard; Thomas uses it lavishly. The psychological appeal to unity counts heavier than the actual existence of chaos. The concept of unity itself, as used in this particular device, is void of any specific content. Unity as such is exalted as an idea. The formalism of this ideal makes it possible to put it surreptitiously into the service of the most sinister purposes. On the one hand, the disunity of American society, particularly in politics and religious life, is solemnly decried, and unity is praised as the only hope for salvation from the ever threatening anarchy. On the other hand, Thomas' own organization with all the characteristics of a party is supposed to represent such a unity, or at least to aim at it. Thomas' propaganda betrays one of the innermost features of fascism, namely, the establishment of something utterly limited and particularistic as the totality, the whole, the community. He feeds upon the ever-present feeling of every man that no true solidarity exists in this society, but he directs these feelings into the channels of very specific interests, antagonistic to such a solidarity – the interest of his racket.

He specializes in denouncing jealousy and pleading for unity, but always in a way that justifies certain basic forms of disunity, particularly the prevailing differences of property and social status.

 

My friend, may I once again re-emphasize through the power of the Holy Ghost that there is no place for jealousy, no place for misunderstanding so far as the Church of God is concerned. You are placed in those places, you cannot choose them. Now, everybody cannot be an officer. Everybody cannot lead the parade, so to speak, but there is just as much honor, yea, more honor to the man or woman who fills the small place in the army as the general who directs the battle. It is just as important, my friend, that God says it is just as much honor and there will be just as great reward as for those who lead things as those who join the battle. We are to be faithful in the place or the places where God has placed us.¹⁷

 

The pledge for unity is characteristically mixed up with defamation of theological controversies:

 

Now, our Lord would not be a party to any jealousy. He would not be a party to encroaching upon the ministry of John. You recall that an attempt had been made by the Pharisees to drive a wedge between the disciples to get them fussing between themselves. You know, my friend, that is always one of the splendid weapons that the Devil uses whenever God takes a great work. Very often it occurs between two ministers.¹⁸

 

Thomas' attack on American denominationalism, which will be discussed later, serves as a sort of metaphor for the dream of political »integration« which is never stated quite explicitly. Sometimes the »unity« device even rings a pro-democratic and antidiscriminatory note:

 

The thing that the world must see today is the everlasting, pulsating personality of Jesus Christ through God, the Holy Ghost, that is here, today, this hour, that rules every man and woman irrespective of your group, your skin color; it matters not what it may be, you and I come alike and we go alike and six feet of earth makes us alike. Whether you are a poor man or rich, Jew or Gentile, it matters not. There is one God in all, through all and over all.¹⁹

 

It is significant, however, that this ideal of equality refers only to supra-natural concepts, namely to the equality before God or before death. The belief in such entities is supposed to work as an integrative force, but the idea of realizing equality on earth is utterly alien to Thomas' propaganda.

 

My friend, you know what Christianity does. Christianity breaks down all race prejudice. Christianity breaks down all class consciousness; Christianity breaks down all economic barriers. Now, I am talking about a spiritual, a spiritual thing. I do not care tonight (!), whether your skin is dark or white or brown or yellow. If you accept my Father through Jesus Christ my Lord, then you are indeed my brother. Now, that does not mean to say that I believe in intermarriage. I do not. I believe that the black people would be better off marrying within their own. I believe the whites would be better off marrying within their race. I believe the yellow people in their race, because God has set it in our boundaries, within the scope of this earth of ours; but listen, if we can even once get Christ across to this world of ours, the whole question of war is going to be settled; the whole question of an economic war is going to be settled; the whole question of Communism in this nation is going to be settled.²⁰

 

The more firmly the idea of ultimate unity is established as an ideology, the easier it is to maintain any kind of inequality within empirical life.

The »unity« device can easily be recognized as a trick by its exclusiveness. While Thomas speaks about unity in high terms, he always presupposes the existence of certain groups, »those evil forces«: the Communists, the radicals, the sceptics, and, of course, the Jews. These groups are a priori exempted from such a unity; they merely threaten it and must be »driven away.« Not one word ever suggests even the faintest possibility of including them in this spiritual unity, be it by conversion or by any other means. They are condemned and have to stay out. Thus, the unity that he advocates is nothing but the ideal of a comprehensive organization of those who participate in his repressive interests, the »right people.«

The »democratic cloak«

 

Thomas' authoritarianism like that of most American Fascist agitators differs in one important aspect from Nazi propaganda. Although some Nazis, such as Schacht, sometimes indulged in defending National Socialism as a true form of democracy, Hitler and his henchmen could openly attack democracy as such. The strength of democratic tradition in America makes this impossible. The famous saying of Huey Long's, that if there ever should be fascism in America, it would be called antifascism, goes for all of his kin. The American attack on democracy usually takes place in the name of democracy. Very often the progressive Roosevelt administration is blamed for being that very dictatorship at which the fascist aims. Thomas, as well as Coughlin, speaks as if he were opposed to all types of dictatorship. However, his critique of dictatorship shows overtones at least of admiration of their successes.

 

In Europe they are actually regimented, the people, by dictatorship. A regimentation has sprung up such as the world has never known for two thousand years, since Caesar, and they are successful (!). There is hardly a nation in the world, today, with the exeption of the British Commonwealth and America, that does not, today, possess a dictatorship that is leading the people with saddle and spurs and bridle. The people of the world, today, are regimented and bound together. They are bound servants and slaves of their masters above them. Now, why is that? Now, I tell you why it is, because of the fact that there is no soul freedom. No man or woman is ever bound in, today, until they are bound outwardly, rather until they are first bound in.²¹

 

While this somewhat confused statement seems to complain of the rise of dictatorship, it explains it by the rather vague concept of a preceding loss of »soul freedom.« He makes dictatorship an issue of inwardness rather than of politics and economy. It is, according to Thomas, due to a negative frame of mind, antagonistic to his type of religion. That frame of mind – the Nazis would have called it »materialistic« – is supposed to be universal. Thus, by implication, the trend towards fascism is presented as being universal, too. The listener is left under the general impression that there is a compulsion in the drift toward dictatorship. It appears to be the only rescue to obey the authority of Thomas himself. Authoritarianism yields only to authority.

Yet, Thomas' persistent references to democracy, to democratic personalities, such as Jackson or Lincoln, and to the American Constitution is exceedingly significant from the point of view of counterpropaganda. He even pretends that his »great movement ... is attempting to protect and preserve our ancient liberties.« ²² This shows that the fascist agitator still has to reckon with democratic ideas as living forces and that he has a chance for success only by perverting them for his own purposes. By perverting them, however, he is always bound to hurt the very feelings which he wants to utilize. Hence, counterpropaganda should point out as concretely as possible in every case the distortions of democratic ideas which take place in the name of democracy. The proof of such distortions would be one of the most effective weapons for defending democracy.

There is a definite procedure for the perpetration of such distortions, a specific twist by which psychological patterns of democracy are transformed into ideological means of fascism. This procedure is mentioned in the Coughlin study by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis under the title of the »Plain Folks Device.«²³ However, little emphasis is laid upon it and it appears in too harmless a light.²⁴ The »plain folks« device is closely akin to the »good old time« idea discussed in Section I. But not only the illusion of closeness, warmth, and intimacy is brought about by some pertinent oratory habits well developed in Thomas, such as addressing the listeners and their families as »folks« or exalting certain homely virtues, such as thrift. Behind the veneer of democratic equality, of being affable and not regarding oneself as something better, looms an aggressive »anti-highbrow« attitude in favor of a carefully calculated image of the common man with sound instincts and little sophistication – an attitude zealously fostered by the Nazi denunciation of the intellectual. The fact that American tradition is intrinsically bound up with democratic ideas and institutions has tended to give to some elements of democracy a quasi-magical halo, an irrational weight of their own. Whole-some as this may be in some respects, it also involves certain dangers upon which fascist propaganda may feed, just as it fed in Germany upon certain undercurrents of the idea of the immediate will of the »folks« vs. its alienated (volksfremd) expression through government by representation. Such a danger applies particularly to the concept of majority which not only reflects American democracy but is also constantly promoted by the almost universal statistical approach to any social problem, and by the practices of advertising. Whereas in a democracy decisions are to be taken on a majority basis, majority as such is not a moral value but a formal principle of government. It tends, however, to become hypostatized in this country as an end in itself rather than as a means. Thus, certain traits of the population which are due to socially non-democratic processes, and antidemocratic in spirit, may be taken and propagated as the last word in democracy, simply because they are characteristics of the majority. This is one of the weaknesses which sometimes allow fascism to mobilize the masses for repressive aims against their actual interests.

On the surface the »plain folks« device appears to be innocuous enough, and it is by no means a characteristic of fascist agitators to flatter the people as they are. One might assume that such a psychological treatment cures the little men and women of their inferiority complexes and elevates their unvoluntarily humble lives, e.g., by inferring, as Thomas does, that the humbleness is self-imposed out of Christian humility. Yet this device has most sinister implications. It reflects the fact that large sectors of the population – in fact, all those who are excluded from the privilege of education, and through manual labor, bear the burden of civilization – preserve certain traits of rudeness and even of savagery which may be called upon in any critical situation. By praising their humbleness and their folksy ways, the agitator indirectly praises this savagery which is simultaneously both repressed and generated by modern culture. Thus, he leads them to release their savagery under the name of robust, sound, plain instincts. Whenever a group is gathered under the slogan of being »just plain folks« who are opposed to the refinements and perversions of cultural life, it is ready to strike at those against whom they may be directed to strike.

»If you only knew«

 

The following group of five devices pertains to Thomas' »strategy of terror.« Here he enters the sphere of the dark, mysterious and frightening, and resorts to techniques which exploit fear and its ambivalence. The terror technique is used in different degrees, from the slight innuendo of hidden evil to the threat of impending catastrophe. Each of these grades has somewhat different psychological implications.

One has to distinguish, throughout Thomas' method, between the quasi-rational, surface stimuli and the underlying irrational psychological mechanisms which he sets in motion. The difference between these two aspects is particularly marked with regard to the terror device. Here the statements themselves and the emotions they first call forth are of a distinctly negative nature. Simultaneously the whole technique aims at giving or promising certain unconscious gratifications as supplementary effects of the negative statements. Since the actual result is probably an amalgam of surface reactions and deeper psychological implications, we shall try to elaborate both and to show how they are related to each other.

The mildest form of terror device employed by Thomas as well as by other fascists is the »if you only knew« device, the suggestion of mysterious dangers known only to the speaker, or almost unconceivable to the normal person, or so obscene that they cannot be discussed in public.

Innuendo points toward the future, to a time when the facts merely hinted at are going to be made clear, or to a final day of reckoning. Curiosity is stirred up and people are made to join the organization, or at least to read its publications, by the hope that they are going to be »let in« at some future date if they simply follow what the agitator says and writes. Mere interest in what one will hear later creates a sort of emotional tie between speaker and listener. This mechanism is used throughout advertising, and represents the harmless, surface aspect of the innuendo technique.

The lure of innuendo grows with its vagueness. It allows for an unchecked play of the imagination and invites all sorts of speculation, enhanced by the fact that masses today, because they feel themselves to be objects of social processes, are anxious to learn what is going on behind the scene. At the same time they are prone psychologically to transform the anonymous processes to which they are subject into personalistic terms of conspiracies, plots by evil powers, secret international organizations, etc. The innuendo device is based upon the neurotic curiosity prevailing within modern mass culture. Every isolated individual longs not only to know the hidden powers which his existence obeys, but even more to know the dark and sinister side of those lives in which he cannot take part. This disposition helps to transform the innuendo device into something not at all harmless.

Its dangerous aspect consists, first of all, in an irrational increase of the speaker's prestige and authority. To listen to innuendo and to rely on purposely vague statements requires from the listeners a certain readiness to »believe,« since the vagueness stands in the way of a comprehensive statement of facts and a discursive treatment of their interrelation. It is exactly this attitude of blind belief which is fostered by Thomas' innuendo technique. Of course, he borrows the concept of belief from Protestant religion, which teaches the primacy of faith. But actually he promotes the idea of belief in him. Religious belief and belief in the movement are permanently confused: »God can only bless the world in proportion to that which they [sic] yield to Christ. To believe is necessary. Do you believe that God is blessing the Nation through this movement?«²⁵ Innuendo is a means of making the leader appear as heir to divine omniscience. He knows what the others do not know. He underscores this difference by never telling exactly what he does know or revealing the full extent of his knowledge. He always reserves for himself a surplus of knowledge which inspires awe and at the same time makes the public wish to participate in it.

This is the decisive mechanism of the »if you only knew« device. The assertion that fascist organizations like Thomas' Crusade are rackets is to be taken very seriously. It does not refer merely to the habitual participation of criminals in such movements, nor to their violent terroristic practices. It emphasizes their sociological structure as such: they are repressive, exclusive and more or less secret ingroups. One has every reason to assume that this aspect of any fascist movement is, though unconsciously, well understood by the prospective followers. Indeed, one of the main incentives offered to them is the wish to »belong,« to become a member of a closed ingroup. This mechanism is evident in the attraction exercised by juvenile gangs upon youth, and probably also even upon adults. The »if you only knew« device is of paramount importance with regard to this desire. Innuendo is a psychological means of making people feel that they already are members of that closed group which strives to catch them. The assumption that one understands something which is not plainly said, a winking of the eye, as it were, presupposes a kind of esoteric »intelligence« which tends to make accomplices of speaker and listener.²⁶ The overtone of this »intelligence« is invariably a threatening one. Psychologically, what purposely remains unsaid is not only the knowledge which is too horrible to be stated frankly but also the horrible thing which one wants to commit oneself, which is not confessed even to oneself, and yet is expressed and even sanctioned by innuendo. The »if you only know« device promises to reveal the secret to those who join the racket and pay their tithe. But it also implies the promise that they will some day participate in the night of long knives, the Utopia of the racket.

Moreover, the form of innuendo is a threat to all those who are excluded from the whispering and are supposed not to know »what I mean.« This idea is often expressed by anti-Semitic leaflets which demand of their readers that the material be passed to »Gentiles only.«

A typical statement of the »if you only knew« type is the following:

 

God has been speaking to this nation. He has been speaking a long time, but the nation would not listen. They did not hear. The preachers turned from God. Oh, I don't mean all of them, of course, but I mean, you know who I mean, a lot of people turned from God, the businessmen turned from God, God has wept all these years for America to return to hear: now, judgment has come. He has allowed radical Communism to come in. My friend, you find it everywhere.²⁷

 

But although the foe is everywhere he does not come out into the open; he remains hidden just as the meaning of Thomas' accusation is hidden by innuendo. While Thomas, like all fascists, stresses the black-and-white dichotomy between friend and enemy, psychologically both categories change into each other. The confusion among them is likely to work as a stimulus on the ambivalent feelings of the listener.

 

The Devil is a coward. He works in the corner, in the dark places and behind closed doors and walls; but Jesus, thank God, works in the light of the day. Now, I want you to note a purely dastardly political address. God always picks these evil forces and compels them to do in the very light of the day that which they desired to do in the dead of midnight.²⁸

 

This divine action is actually what Thomas constantly promises to do himself, namely to publicly expose the evil forces. But he prefers to do it by innuendo, as it were, »behind closed doors and walls.«

 

My friend, throughout the United States, today, wherever men and women are preaching the Gospel of the Son of God, and wherever they are calling attention to the imminent peril of Communism, there we find the clergy being attacked and you find forces being used to discredit the leaders. Just now, according to the newspapers of last night, you find in Southern California where a tremendous program has been put on and financed by a certain force to discredit every leading clergyman in Southern California, and where they have financed these men to attack the outstanding clergymen in Southern California.²⁹

 

Such a statement is certainly not less dark than the corners of »those evil forces.« It may safely be assumed that the basic understanding between Thomas and his listeners, wherever he uses innuendo, refers to the Jews: they are the »certain forces.« The threat against them is emphasized by the very fact that he avoids the word »Jew« in his exoteric addresses, while mentioning Communists and radicals, and calls them only »these forces.« He implies that everyone knows who and what they are, that it is not even necessary to speak about them. They appear doomed in advance. Thus even the fact that in a democracy open anti-Semitic statements are somewhat handicapped by official public opinion is changed into an anti-Semitic tool of its own.

»Dirty linen« device

 

The indispensable supplement to innuendo is actual or imaginary revelation. Thomas often made »if you only knew« promises in his radio speeches and then actually told the story in his church. Once more, the relation of the trick to commercial advertising is obvious. People are allowed to peep behind the scene, as it were, and to learn the inside story. They seem to share the privilege of the well-informed few. This idea is reminiscent of the »ingroup« aspect mentioned above.

In order to grasp the deeper psychological implications of this device, one must look at the peculiar contents to which propagandistic revelations usually refer. They belong, in most cases, to the sphere of scandal-mongering and usually pertain either to graft and corruption, or to sex.

One might well compare the psychological mechanism set in motion by the »dirty linen« device to a certain gesture which one can observe in many people. When they smell a bad odor, they very often do not turn away but eagerly breathe the pested air, sniff the stench and pretend to identify it while complaining of its repulsiveness. One does not have to be a psychoanalyst to suspect that these people unconsciously enjoy the bad smell. The appeal of scandal stories is very similar. Indignation about a scandal is in most cases a thin rationalization; actually the listener finds some pleasure in the story. One may well assume that the dark, forbidden things whose revelation he indignantly enjoys are the same things that he himself would love to indulge in.

This mechanism has become automatized to such an extent that the gratification comes to be derived from the act of revelation as such, no matter what actually is revealed. Revelation per se is experienced as the fulfillment of a promise and obtains an almost ceremonial character which may be colored by religious memories.

This accounts for one of the strangest phenomena concerned in the »dirty linen« device: the striking disproportion between the objective weight of the revealed facts, and the psychological importance they gain. The fascist-minded listener, at least, is willing to accept without examination any scandal story, even a most stupid one like the ritual murder legend. Furthermore, he generalizes cases which may happen under any political system, regarding them as typical of democracy, especially of its »plutocratic« nature. He becomes furious about facts which at closer scrutiny appear most innocent, or belong so strictly to the sphere of private life that nobody has a moral right to interfere. Thus, a certain fur coat of the Berlin Bürgermeister, supposedly a bribe, played a tremendous role in Nazi propaganda during the last years of the Weimar Republic, although the possession of a fur coat could not possibly be regarded as an outrageous luxury. What mattered was the revelation, not the fact.

Generally, the scandals which are revealed are quite unspecific and by no means characterize only those who are vilified. Thus, the Nazis made the most of certain corruption cases in which Jews – the Barmats, Kutisker, and the Sklareks – were involved. During the same period, and due to the same economic conditions, there were even bigger corruption cases on the right – the Lahusen case and the Neudeck affair which amounted to bribery of the Reichspräsident Hindenburg himself. These latter cases, however, were quickly oppressed and got little Publicity. This may partly be explained by the fact that reaction controlled most public communications during the later years of the Weimar Republic. In general, there seems to be a greater indulgence in the airing of dirty linen among reactionaries than among progressives. The shift of social problems to private responsibilities, a general mood of repressiveness which tends to blacken anyone who enjoys himself rather than proves his acquisitive efficiency, and shrewd speculation on certain instincts of the frustrated majority may account for this fact. Those who want conditions to be unchanged are always ready to put the blame for any evil upon individuals who do not comply with the accepted standards of morality. Hypocrisy is a prerogative of conformism.

It is not absent from Thomas' arsenal. In his case, however, the simple motive of gratification to be obtained through spicy revelations overshadows most other considerations. Though he particularly relishes picturing the Communists as a lot of wanton criminals, it does not matter too much to him whether the scandals he divulges affect friend or foe. He occasionally describes himself as a victim of scandal stories.

 

I will never forget that, my first experience as a pastor in San Pedro and a situation I found myself in, when I arrived and I got into a terrific feud over a moral issue. A scandal sheet appeared about me that was my first experience with morale ... they used a criminal who professed conversion, but he had been sent in there by these people to gather information and blacken my name and they published all the things in the world that they could think about me, but within the flight of twelve months, I found out what it was. I found that a man who was really of the underworld of this city had been paying for that. I thank God through every conflict in my life that I have gone through, my Lord and Savior has stood by me.³⁰

 

Curiosity aroused by reference to the sheet is compensated by the scandal stories that Thomas tells about others. The most outstanding is one about a phony decree concerning the general prostitution of womanhood in Russia. In his own church, he went into juicy details, in true Streicher style. In his radio addresses, he soft-pedals the story and relies on innuendo as being perhaps even more effective than revelation:

 

That contains the startling decree of Moscow concerning the making free of womanhood in Russia. Let me read just for a moment, my friend, in connection with that, the word of an outstanding woman, the wife of an American engineer, Mrs. McMurray, who came back just a few months ago. She said about Russia, ›I will never go back.‹ She said, ›sorrow and fear and hate combined with the jeering contempt for the finer things of life hang over the land of the Soviet.‹ Then she declared, ›no moral code is preserved. Men and women live together like animals. They live where and how the government directs. All labor is forced. If they do not work where the government commands, they are refused food-cards. I could not make friends. People are afraid of everyone and everything. Such is the red paradise.‹³¹

 

It should be noted that this quotation, introduced by Thomas »in connection with« the supposed prostitution of womanhood in Russia, contains no specific reference to such prostitution but only a vague complaint about men and women living together »like animals.« Thus the quotation sounds like a kind of anticlimax. But emphasis is laid upon the act of revelation as such. Through the »dirty linen« device, propaganda itself becomes the purpose of propaganda.

 

Be certain to get your request in quickly for the new edition of the Christian American Crusader. This will contain information of the Communists' and radicals' attack upon the clergy of America. The plots of the Communists are almost impossible to believe. I am giving you the whole setup. I am giving the names as I did Sunday night. By the way, I am giving more of this next Sunday night.³²

»Tingling backbone« device

 

The »dirty linen« device is universally bound up with the tendency to terrorize listeners. When they are told that womanhood is prostituted in Russia they are made to fear that the same will happen to their wives, sisters, and daughters. Communist atrocities disclosed to them become threats of what will happen to themselves tomorrow. Here the double and almost self-contradictory character of the device is outspoken. The surface effect is that people react, out of fear, by organizing themselves to combat the threatening danger. The unconscious effect is, bluntly speaking, that they enjoy the description of atrocities because they themselves want to commit them some day. Pleasure in cruelty is closely related to pleasure in filth.

Fortunately, Thomas himself was kind enough to formulate a sentence which so plainly exhibits ambivalence towards atrocity stories that our interpretation can hardly be regarded as a matter of arbitrary speculation: »You also, send for the ›Imminent Peril of Communism for This Nation,‹ and after you read that, if your backbone does not tingle, then, my friend, there is something wrong with you.«³³

The promise to make the reader's backbone tingle has sense only if the sensation in store for the reader is in some respect pleasant to him. Thomas does not even care to hide this.

One aspect of propaganda through terror ought to be stressed particularly. It is generally assumed that fascist agitators promise everything to everyone. Scrutiny of Thomas' speeches at least makes the validity of this hypothesis rather doubtful. Thomas actually promises very little – mostly rewards in Eternity. Instead he terrorizes his audience by constantly pointing out all sorts of threats to them. He does not rely so much on their desire for happiness as on their fear that things may become even worse, while ceaselessly stressing that they are desperate even now. Rationally this evokes the worries of small people – the loss of their property and security. But this rational or half-rational stimulus is probably not the decisive one. The promise implied in terror propaganda is rather that of destruction as such. This leads to a certain qualification of our thesis on ambivalence. It would be perhaps too rationalistic to assume that the atrocities are necessarily those one wants to commit against the weak, though doubtlessly this impulse plays a major role. But the masochistic component is no less developed than the sadistic one. The prospective fascist may long for the destruction of himself no less than for that of the adversaries, destruction being a substitute for his deepest and most inhibited desires. This is confirmed by the constant references of fascists to self-sacrifice, or by certain statements made by Hitler, such as the one referred to by Rauschning, that if Hitler looses a Ragnarök, a Twilight of the Gods will take place. Here the fascist's subconscious knowledge of the ultimate hopelessness of his undertakings probably comes into play. He realizes that his solution is no solution, that in the long run it is doomed. Any keen observer could notice this feeling in Nazi Germany before the war broke out. Hopelessness seeks a desperate way out. Annihilation is the psychological substitute for the millenium – a day when the difference between the ego and the others, between poor and rich, between powerful and impotent, will be submerged in one great inarticulate unity. If no hope of true solidarity is held out to the masses, they may desperately stick to this negative substitute.³⁴

Thomas' call to follow him as leader is terroristic. His followers are told that they should believe, without a clear distinction as to whether they are to believe in God or in Thomas. But those who do not believe are going to be punished anyway:

 

Now, remember that with belief you may do it. Isn't it worth while? I say that you must do it. You must accept Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God as your personal Savior from the penalty of power of indwelling sin. Now, unless you do that, you are a lost man or a lost woman. You are not only lost in this life but your soul shall be lost in that world which is to come. I have been praying lately that God would give me the true conception of a lost soul (!) and I am not sure that I have it, this morning, and I am not sure that you have it, this morning, for if I believe this word as I should believe it, I want to tell you that I would be crying to God night and day.³⁵

 

The prayer for the true conception of a lost soul is an involuntary hint of the gratification he gets out of the lurid. Instead of praying that the lost soul may be saved he wishes to give as vivid a picture of the »lost« as possible. The associational sequence of his ideas converts this picture into a means of terrorizing his audience. He wants them to cry to God night and day. He expects that readiness to follow him may spring out of their fear as well as out of their masochistic pleasure in the imagery of the lost soul. It is hardly accidental that this attempt to terrorize the audience is linked up with the concept of belief. People are terrorized in order to believe, to wit, to stop thinking. Conversely, terrorized people are incapable of clear thinking and are reduced to the blind reactions of the sauve-qui-peut-pattern, an attitude particularly favorable to adherence to a leader who promises to think and act for them if only they trust in him. In order to achieve this, Thomas skillfully confuses the threat of eternal penalties with the threat of earthly unpleasantness, and makes metaphysical salvation synonymous with membership in the Christian American Crusade:

 

I appeal to the man who walks the streets that you remember there is coming a day, my friends, when God will compel you to give an account of the deeds that you are done in the body [sic]. My friend, are you an American? Are you a Christian? If you are, you will take cognizance of the situation facing America, but if you are not, you are a coward.³⁶

 

Since a Presbyterian clergyman cannot well threaten with concentration camps he manipulates Eternity in such a way that it serves exactly the same purpose. Thus the most modern pattern of oppression by terror draws upon the oldest resource of terrorism.

»Last hour« device

 

Another aspect of Thomas' terror technique ought to be stressed. It consists of the direct or indirect assertion that a catastrophe is imminent, that the situation is desperate and has reached a peak of crisis, that some change must be made immediately. »Thinking men and women across this nation are fast going to their feet, for they know that things cannot go on much longer as they are.«³⁷ In Thomas' propaganda every hour is the last hour.

One is reminded at first sight of the common pattern of advertising: »This offer holds good only for a few days.« People are admonished to act at once, to join the movement without further delay. Behind this lies the simple consideration that people tend to forget what they do not carry out right now. Particularly, terroristic stimuli, which always carry with themselves most unpleasant connotations, are likely to be psychologically repressed fairly soon. Terroristic propaganda works only »on the spot.«

This, however, scratches only the surface of the phenomenon. The reference to impending doom, and particularly to an impending world catastrophe, is much older than industrial society. It has its roots in the apocalyptic element of Christian religion. It is not accidental that Thomas, like all revivalist sectarians, often refers to the biblical battle of Armageddon, which he skillfully confuses with the activities of his group.

Moreover, Thomas, in apparent contradiction to all the propagandistic devices implied by the »fait accompli« technique, often depicts his own organization as facing an immediate crisis, as being in desperate need of funds, and sometimes goes so far as to pretend that he cannot carry on forty-eight hours longer. His speeches constantly present every issue as a critical one calling for immediate action. There is a considerable gap between his passionate appeals to save the nation in the »last hour,« and the comparatively weak and accidental indices of impending doom he provides – mostly complaints about the decrease of Christian orthodoxy or a spreading of atheistic teachings in the universities. A typical example of the mixture of insignificant complaints and apocalyptic diatribes is the following:

 

The lack of power and faithfulness in the ministries and the worldliness of the churches, the decrease of membership and the spirit of the Antichrist which is now spreading its great tentacles in our universities, and the undermining of our states, of our government, all point out to the certain serious crisis which at last has come upon us.³⁸

 

»Serious crisis« has become a »magical word,« and the existence of such a crisis is stressed at any price, even through such ludicrous statements as the decrease of church membership. Thomas presumes that his followers think in terms of their own narrowest experiences, and that their interest is centered around church matters. An empty church supposedly suffices to convince them of the imminent danger of a collapse of the American nation.

A tentative explanation of the irrational emphasis laid upon the idea of crisis may be the following: Thomas, like all fascists, reckons with followers who are deeply discontended and also even destitute. Their objective situation might possibly convert them into radical revolutionaries. One of the main tasks of the fascist is to prevent this and to divert revolutionary trends into their own line of thought, for their own purposes. In order to achieve this aim, the fascist agitator steals, as it were, the concept of revolution. Again, the idea of catastrophe, of the fateful moment, is the substitute. It implies radical change without, however, having any specific social contents. Nobody looks beyond the end of the world. Moreover, catastrophe is something that happens to people rather than materializing by their own free will. They are divested of their spontaneity and transformed into spectators of the great world-historical events which are going to be decided over their heads, while their own energies are absorbed by their adherence to the organization, and their love for the leader.

Psychoanalysis has sometimes noted that a neurotic feeling of impotence is often expressed through a peculiar attitude towards the element of time. The less one is capable of acting on one's own account, the more one is likely to expect everything from time in abstracto: »It cannot go on like this much longer.« The »last hour« device feeds on this disposition. Time as such is made a guarantor of coming change and therefore the »follower« is rid of his own responsibility. He simply has to do what »the hour calls for.« By presenting this hour as the last hour – »Communism is not coming, it is right here« – this device is linked to the »fait accompli« technique.

Of course, the catastrophe is described throughout Thomas' speeches not as something desirable but as a danger. But this is hardly more than a rationalization. Apart from an emotional emphasis laid upon the idea of catastrophe which seems to take it for granted that this notion is not altogether unwelcome to the listeners, there is an easy transition from warning of the danger of catastrophe to advertising it. If the situation is desperate, desperate means are necessary: The answer to the »imminent danger of Communism« is the eradication of Communists, radicals, and »those evil forces,« that is, the pogrom. The idea that some change has to be made, abstract and yet with so many associations of violence and brutality, is the necessary consequence of the »last hour« device. The last hour of which the fascist warns is actually the putsch which he wants to commit himself. Purely negative punitive action substitutes for a rational policy by which things might really become better.

 

I believe I know some of the things you are going to do, because I know of the kind of material that is on the inside of those bodies of yours, I believe that you are going to seek the truth. I believe I know just how you are going to act. I believe that you are going to rise up in your wrath, in your indignation, in your love for the old flag, you are going to say to these forces that have taken our nation down to the very depths: thus far shalt thou go and not one step farther. Now, I believe you are going to do that.³⁹

 

It is interesting to note that Thomas' clamor for an »awakening«⁴⁰ to the threat of the impending catastrophe is conceived in terms of »back« rather than of »forward.« The awakening of America is represented as a restoration of something long over. Moreover, it is understood as an act not of conscious self-determination, but of bowing to the authority of the father. In fact, it is just the opposite of what one should expect such an awakening to be: »Awake, America, back to your knees, back to the father of the fathers, to the place where God would have you to be.«⁴¹ Here Thomas comes unwittingly near to one of the favorite concepts of fascist and anti-Semitic intellectuals, that nonentity, the »conservative revolution.«

»Black hand« (Feme) device

 

It has been noted above that the »innuendo« technique is related to the idea of a closed, violent, strictly ruled ingroup – a racket. This relationship makes itself keenly felt in the terror propaganda of fascism. Strongly reminiscent of plain, non-political racketeering, terror is applied no less, and perhaps even more, to one's own followers than to the opponents. This technique played a very large role in Nazidom under the title of »Feme.« The most dangerous forces are supposedly those working from inside. The Fascist cannot help feeling surrounded by traitors, and so continuously threatens to exterminate them.

By innuendo Thomas calls for the universal vigilance of one »crusader« against the other:

 

My friend, I am never afraid of the world. I am never fearful of the attack of Satan. I know where to place the world. I know where to place those who are on the other side, but I tell you, my friend, you must be careful within. Some one will get on the inside of the church and yield himself to the Devil and attempt to kill the work of God by somebody inside the church. I have never been attacked in the years, except it has come from within. You men and women will always bear me witness of that fact. You look out for the attack within with some one very close to you, through jealousy or some other thing, that Satan will bring upon them.⁴²

 

Often enough the fascist leader has actual reasons for such warnings. Rackets attract racketeers; criminals are prone to join all sorts of hooligan organizations and they are likely, for various reasons, to quit and go over to any other party from whom they expect more. Furthermore, the element of secrecy inherent in all kinds of fascist conspiracies breeds indiscretion and treachery. Terror, directed against the insiders, strengthens the authority which appears to be absolute only if no infringement whatsoever is tolerated, if the strictest discipline is enforced. This can be achieved only if even the slightest deviation is branded as treachery, and ruthlessly persecuted.

But here, again, certain deeper-lying issues enter the picture. The »black hand« device is a complement of the »unity« trick, a means of integrating the divergent elements of a repressive and exclusive organization. Its exclusiveness can be maintained only by vigilantism, by spying among the members who are kept in a permanent state of mutual distrust. The »Feme« threat which the fascist agitator utters against his own followers foreshadow the complete atomization of the whole population which takes place in totalitarian states. Repressive unity results in the oppression of all non-professional activities not immediately controlled by the government, or the party. Conspirators must be kept completely alienated from each other with regard to their convictions if they are to form a compact group. The fascist racket is the very parody of that »Volksgemeinschaft,« people's community, that it boasts of being. Fellow members of fascist organizations are more jealous, more suspicious, more ready to »liquidate« each other than even the most hard-boiled competitors. To point this out would be the real answer to the »human interest« trick.

However, the most sinister implication of the »black hand« device pertains to one of the innermost characteristics of racketeering and fascism. Both may be defined as types of organizations from which there is no way back. The sacrifice of the individual to the collectivity discussed above means that one has to surrender totally, with soul and body, without qualification or reservation. This is expressed by the postulate of irrevocability, by oaths, blood symbolism, initiation rites, etc. The wish to »get out« of a compulsory community is the primary gesture by which the longing for freedom expresses itself. Nothing is more hideous to the fascist than this desire. He who changes his mind and who wants to »get out again,« no matter what his motives may be or how essentially decent he may be, is regarded as the arch-enemy. Hence, change of opinion as such is characterized as treachery, and put under severe punishment. As important as the organizatory effect of the »Feme« idea is the psychological one: whoever enters the organization is made to understand that there is no way out, and the character of irrevocability thus bestowed upon his decision works only as an emotional tie to the racket. The effect is by no means only fear. People tend to love that which they cannot quit – to identify themselves with even their prison walls. It is this particular disposition on which the fascist emphasis upon »Feme« persistently feeds.

The most blatant example of the »black hand« device took place on June 30, 1934, with the shooting of a large number of Nazis, some of whom may not have been conspirators at all, with due consideration to the propagandistic effect. Thomas' mentality shows perhaps unwitting traces of an attitude which finally develops into the pitiless terrorization of one's own organization. This ultimate twisting of terror toward just the »ingroup« should be stressed by counterpropaganda.

»Let us be practical«

 

Hitler, following Bismarckian tradition, often speaks about Realpolitik. In his case, this simply refers to the right of the strong. However, the term has deeper implications than a mere rationalization of Machiavellian cynicism. In spite of the perennial appeal to idealism, heroism, and the spirit of sacrifice, the fascist never forgets to keep his followers aware that, essentially, he does not want the evil to disappear from the world. He aims at his own group's taking over the reins, but not at an abolition of repression itself. He derides any idea of »Utopia« and enjoys the notion that the world is not only bad, but that it shall remain essentially as bad as it is, and that it is a punishable crime to think that it could be essentially different. This device has worked with all reactionary theoreticians since Hobbes, and has followed like a shadow all the high-sounding ideologies of the modern age. In a completely deteriorated form which, however, sheds light upon the ultimate content of this idea, it recurs in Thomas. Whereas he preaches lofty religious ideals, most of them smelling of such an outdated orthodoxy that he cannot seriously expect his followers to be convinced, he also shows a passionate interest in all sorts of practical matters, of Realpolitik in the pettiest sense of the word. He displays a rationalism in calculating and organizing his group which conflicts at every point with the sturdy irrationality of his religious teachings. It is the distance of his »practical« common-sense passages from his official ideology, which demonstrates, to the subconscious at least, the impotence of those ideals themselves and their ultimate spuriousness. The ideals serve mainly to veil superficially his lust for power and his administrative manipulation, and to brand the adversaries as being morally inferior. The practical down-to-earth passages, however, show to the audience not only that their leader is a man of common sense as they think they are, but also that what actually matters to them is an organization, competitive power, and an earthly success. It is hard to say whether the blatant contradiction between high-flown phraseology and down-to-earthness is entirely conscious with Thomas, or whether it is due to his actually representing an average lower-middle-class type. But however this may be, this contradiction is not so much an obstacle to the effectiveness of his speeches as an auxiliary force in making them effective. The less interconnected the ideal and, as he sometimes chooses to call it, his »business« are, the more distinctly the audience realizes that the ideals are ideals, but that he means business.

One could not formulate the configuration between the apparently irreconcilable elements of Thomas' speeches more clearly than he himself does: »We try to be practical here. We try to preach the gospel of our Lord within all of the fervor, and the love, and the power that God gives us through the spirit.«⁴³

The idea of being practical refers above all to money, to the money he wants to obtain as well as to the money of his followers. God the Almighty and the printer's bill are indiscriminately lumped together:

 

We have a mighty God. If we honor him, he will take care of every need. We have got to pay bills today – this radio, printer's bill, office help, telephone. Listen, get down and help us. I am not asking you to do anything that I am not doing. My family are sacrificing every possible dollar that we can, because we want to see this movement going across the United States. I find many people of many sections are listening and praying and blessing God.⁴⁴

 

The idea that God takes care of every need is interpreted by Thomas even more practically: he regards God as a sort of investment consultant.

 

Go and sin no more. A great many people have lost material possession. They have lost stocks and bonds and various things. I want to say to you, today, that no man or woman has ever consulted God about any investment and has listened to God, alone, and lost. If you go to God and lay it before the Lord, you have never lost a dollar, but if you have not, you fail at once.⁴⁵

 

The implication, again, builds a sort of mild blackmail. To be faithful to God is as much as »being faithful with the tithes of God«⁴⁶ and the tithes of God are always liberally interpreted by Thomas as the donation to »this movement.«

The patriotic ideal fares no better than the religious one. The appeal to save America is confused with the fear that the stocks may lose their value. It is strongly suggested by Thomas that the great fight against the Antichrist is a practical one, namely that it serves to safeguard one's private property, as »those evil forces« want to take away the property of the small man.

 

Ah, my friend, will you help us to meet God's little children before the Antichrist comes, before the wolves of life could possibly take them and tear them to pieces. You see, well, I am being satisfied as a whole. Why should I worry? My friend, listen, when the Antichrist takes hold of America, and he will lake hold in the very immediate near future unless you and I and millions like us are able to hold back those forces for a little while longer, that [sic] your stocks will be useless, that [sic] your home will be of no use. My dear brother, my dear sister, it is now or never. You cannot, my friend, afford not to have a part in this great Christian American program. You cannot afford to have this message of God go off this radio for the lack of your support.⁴⁷

 

The practical spirit (monetary categories) is applied even to Biblical stories such as, of all things, that of Mary Magdalen sacrificing to Christ:

 

There were men in that day, as well as in this day, who made a business of collecting that pure oil, a little drop of which would so odorize a room that the scent of it would last for hours. She saw what was coming. Like the woman that she was, she prepared for it. She saved up her dimes and nickels. Now, what do you suppose, even in that day, it cost her to collect that whole ..., about 300 shillings, a shilling being about 17 cents now, 300 times 17 and you will have the amount there, about $51. You multiply the purchasing power in that day with this day, perhaps a hundred times the purchasing value, and you will secure some general idea of the cost to Mary. It may well have been that Mary sacrificed, sacrificed all her possessions, indeed. It is my opinion that she did. She went and sold, she perhaps sold her house and let. ...⁴⁸

 

The implications of this passage are manifold. There is, first of all, the old exegetic technique of translating Biblical stories into terms of the everyday life of the listeners in order to make it more understandable to them – hence, the dimes and nickels. But this is merely the surface. The listener is actually conveyed the idea that even the most sublime actions of the Bible are »practical,« that they can be expressed, as it were, in money, and that money is the measurement for everything, even for religious ecstasy, so that indirectly the most earthly concepts become a yardstick for the supposedly sublime ones. While apparently the magnitude of Mary's sacrifice is exalted, it is, in a deeper psychological sense, divested of its dignity and made profane by its transformation into dollars and purchasing value; and the crusader is made to realize that it is these which count, and not religion which has to be translated into them in order to make any sense at all. One may safely assume that there are few devices employed in Thomas' technique which meet with a greater response from his audience than this poor one. Indeed, his speeches are larded with intentionally trite, mundane, practical passages of which the preceding ones are but a few examples gathered at random.

One may well object that we have made more of this particular device than there is to it. It may be understood as a simple appeal to the traditional, practical sense of the Americans which cannot be reached by any ideals unless they are put immediately into »operational terms.« One may even point to homiletic traditions in American sects and in institutions such as the Salvation Army or Christian Science, where religion is transformed into something utterly pragmatic in order that it may be at all acceptable to the American people. Even if this is to be admitted, one can hardly deny that the trick of »pragmatism« in apparently idealistic issues has obtained a new meaning. Formerly, it may have been a means to the end of religious conversion and more or less genuine revivals. Today for fascist propaganda, revivals and conversions have become a means to the end that people might become practical, that is to say that they might yield any theoretical thought of their own, might become integrated into teams and organizations, and might take action in accordance with their collective interest rather than with their rational conviction. The lack of capacity for abstraction, the old compulsion to »illustrate« any concept by its most immediate application which often implies a deterioration of its true meaning, this incapacity for abstraction which is more likely to have become stronger than to have decreased under modern conditions, is used as a lever for propagandistic purposes. The ideal that becomes immediately and inconsiderately identified with some practical measure or attitude, becomes meaningless as an ideal and is reduced to a mere embellishment of the next practical step. This, however is actually what Thomas' propaganda, like that of all fascists, aims at. Conscience becomes nothing but an ideology which lends its glamour to the deeds of naked self-interest, carried out by the organization. By discrediting the ideas while they are being transformed into terms of practical, everyday life, the follower is made to understand that what matters is not the idea, not even the intentionally vague »matter for which it stands,« but in the last analysis only the organization itself, that is to say, the power apparatus and that authority which finally decides what policy is expedient.

Fußnoten

 

1 The same dichotomy pertains to Hitler's speeches. There is a large difference between his addresses to the old party members and those for the outer world. Incidentally, the distinction between speeches »for home consumption« and others has become quite universal and is almost officially recognized. The logic of manipulation cynically admits different »truths.«

 

2 Edmond Taylor, The Strategy of Terror: Europe's Inner Front (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940).

 

3 July 10, 1935.

 

4 July 14, 1935.

 

[5 The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, The Fine Art of Propaganda: A Study of Father Coughlin's Speeches, eds. Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939) pp. 26–46; 95–104.]

 

6 May 29, 1935.

 

7 Ibid.

 

8 June 25, 1935.

 

9 July 5, 1935.

 

[10 Lee and Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda.]

 

11 At least a few examples for these devices may be given.

Transfer. »From all indication, there is arising in this country a great crusade of Christian American Crusaders and that is we can continue another twelve months over this station and a national hookup, that this movement alone will save the United States. In the words of ex-President Hoover, yesterday, he said that, ›America has a responsibility to the world far beyond the boundaries of our own land, so far as democracy and representative form of government is concerned and the maintaining of a religious freedom upon the part of an individual.‹ My friend, our ex-President is correct: Unless you people will guard the freedom that our forefathers have given to us ...« (July 5, 1935). The quotation from Hoover is a commonplace Statement about America's international responsibilities which any statesman might make at any time. By coupling it with an assertion that his organization will save the United States, however, Thomas makes it appear that Hoover would endorse the Christian American Crusade. Actually, of course, the agreement applies to a notion so abstract that practically everyone would concur. The authority of Herbert Hoover, who is not accidentally quoted as »ex-President,« is psychologically transferred to Thomas' group by the intermediary link of agreement with regard to some vague generalities. There is not the faintest proof that Hoover actually was in sympathy with Thomas' propaganda.

Band wagon. Every letter Thomas receives is presented as an index of the avalanche-like character of his movement: »Here is one from Ohio, showing the extent of the movement that is reaching out over this station, another from Kentucky ordering quantities of the literature, another from Nebraska, another from Oklahoma and another from Oregon. Now, I just tell that in order to let you folks know the extent that this thing is going« (June 12, 1935). In one characteristic example the band wagon idea is combined with a metaphor of destructive violence: »I have in my hand about eight or ten letters. Here is one from a sister down in Compton. She says: ›I am glad that you are firing a shot heard around the United States of America‹« (June 12, 1935).

 

12 A. Sanders, »Social Ideas in McGuffey Readers,« Public Opinion Quarterly V, 4 (fall, 1941), pp. 579–589.

 

13 All three terms have exactly the same meaning. Moreover, they all have a certain bourgeois ring and carry no association of nobility. The Latin word dux fairly early was applied to feudal war lords (Herzöge) and so lost its original functional reference to one who draws others behind him. This feudal notion of a dux qua Herzog is expressed in Italian by duca. Mussolini consciously went back to the original functional meaning by calling himself not duca but Duce. With the leader charisma becomes a profession, a kind of work that must be done.

Incidentally, traces of anti-feudal authoritarianism can be found in Richard Wagner. His Rienzi calls himself, significantly enough, »tribune,« a title referring to the Roman representative of the plebs, and Lohengrin is called Schützer von Brabant, Protector of Brabant. Protector later became a Nazi title bestowed upon the notorious Heydrich. The affinity of such traits to the »messenger device« should not be overlooked.

 

14 June 14, 1935.

 

15 June 9, 1935.

 

16 Cf. the role played by the concept of the old »party comrades« in Germany and the scorn with which Goebbels treated those who joined the party after March 1933.

 

17 May 23, 1935.

 

18 May 25, 1935.

 

19 May 26, 1935.

 

20 April 25, 1935.

 

21 June 19, 1935.

 

22 April, 1935.

 

23 Lee and Lee, The Fine Art of Propaganda, pp. 92–93.

 

24 Cf. the assertion that it »serves well many another democratic and republican politicians both for socially desirable and undesirable purposes« (Ibid.). The purposes may sometimes be desirable but still the psychological implications of the device itself are pernicious. It establishes conformism as a moral principle and Mr. Average as a superior person simply because he is average. It is intrinsically related to the resentment against anyone who is different and hence virtually directed against any minority group.

 

25 June 11, 1935.

 

26 This is particularly true of all kinds of anti-Semitic statements. Lewis Browne has symbolized this device by the title of his book; See What I Mean? (New York: Random House, 1943).

 

27 July 7, 1935.

 

28 July 10, 1935.

 

29 July 3, 1935.

 

30 July 1, 1935.

 

31 July 7, 1935.

 

32 July 9, 1935.

 

33 July 7, 1935.

 

34 The tendency towards general destruction is particularly marked in Germany, both because of certain traditions of the German situation in terms of world competition. The feeling of this hopelessness has never subsided under the Hitler regime. Yet this general destructiveness is by no means totally absent from the American scene. We call to mind here only the affair of Orson Welles' »Invasion from Mars,« and the success of the San Francisco picture which relishes the details of a blind natural catastrophe. This destructiveness is directed first against civilization as such. Only afterwards it is mobilized against certain groups, such as the Negroes or the Jews. (Cf. Hadley Cantril, The Invasion from Mars [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940].)

 

35 May 25, 1935.

 

36 May 26, 1935.

 

37 July 14, 1935.

 

38 July 14, 1935.

 

39 June 4, 1935.

 

40 Cf. »indefatigability« device.

 

41 July 13, 1935.

 

42 July 13, 1935.

 

43 June 9, 1935.

 

44 May 27, 1935.

 

45 June 5, 1935.

 

46 Ibid.

 

47 July 5, 1935.

 

48 July 12, 1935.