Chapter 13: “Touching the Tiger’s Buttocks”: The Third Vietnam War
1 “Touch the tiger’s buttocks” is a Chinese idiom
popularized by Mao, meaning to do something daring or dangerous.
The occasion of this remark was my meeting with Hua Guofeng in
Beijing in April 1979.
2 During the Cultural Revolution, then Defense
Minister Lin Biao abolished all ranks and insignia and ordered
extensive ideological training for Chinese troops using the “Little
Red Book” of Mao’s aphorisms. The PLA was called on to play social
and ideological roles far outside the mission of an ordinary
military. A penetrating account of the toll these developments took
on the PLA during the conflict with Vietnam may be found in Edward
O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third
Indochina War (New York: Routledge, 2007).
3 “Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Pham Van Dong:
Beijing, 29 April 1968,” in Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein
Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77
Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in
Indochina, 1964–1977,” Cold War International History Project
Working Paper Series, working paper no. 22 (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson International History Project, May 1998), 127–28.
(Brackets in original.)
4 See Chapter 8, “The Road to Reconciliation,” page
205.
5 I have always believed that having been willing
to force the—to Mao—ideologically correct Khmer Rouge into a
compromise, unnecessarily as it turned out, contributed to Zhou’s
fall. See also Kissinger, Years of
Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 368.
6 Robert S. Ross, The
Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 74, quoting Xinhua news
report (August 15, 1975), as translated in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report, People’s Republic of China
(August 18, 1975), A7.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 98, quoting Xinhua news report (March 15,
1976), as translated in FBIS Daily Report, People’s Republic of
China (March 16, 1976), A13.
9 In April 1978, the Afghan President was
assassinated and his government was replaced; on December 5, 1978,
the Soviet Union and the new government of Afghanistan entered into
a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation; and on
February 19, 1979, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan was
assassinated.
10 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices:
Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1983), 79.
11 “President Carter’s Instructions to Zbigniew
Brzezinski for His Mission to China, May 17, 1978,” in Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of
the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 1985), Annex I, 2.
12 The five principles were: affirmation of a one
China policy; a commitment not to offer American support to Taiwan
independence movements; American discouragement of a hypothetical
Japanese deployment into Taiwan; support for any peaceful
resolution between Beijing and Taipei; and a commitment to
continued normalization. See Chapter 9, “Resumption of Relations:
First Encounters with Mao and Zhou,” page 271.
13 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the
President’s Meeting with the People’s Republic of China Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January, 29th 1979, 3:35–4:59
p.m.,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL), Vertical
File—China, item no. 270, 10–11.
14 “Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with
Foreign Minister Huang Hua: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL,
Vertical File—China, item no. 232, 3.
15 Ibid., 6–7.
16 Ibid. Sadat served as President of Egypt from
1970 until his assassination in 1981. The “bold action” referred to
included Sadat’s expulsion of over twenty thousand Soviet military
advisors from Egypt in 1972, the launching of the October 1973 War,
and the subsequent entry into a peace process with
Israel.
17 Ibid., 4.
18 Ibid., 10–11.
19 “Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical
File—China, item no. 232-e, 16.
20 Ibid., 5–6.
21 “Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng: Beijing, May 22nd, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical
File—China, item no. 233c, 4–5.
22 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the
President’s Meeting with Ambassador Ch’ai Tse-min: Washington,
September 19, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 250b,
3.
23 “Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing: Beijing, May 21st 1978,” JCPL, Vertical
File—China, item no. 232-e, 6.
24 In recent years, Chinese leaders and policy
analysts have introduced the phrase “peaceful rise” to describe
China’s foreign policy aspiration to achieve major-power status
within the framework of the existing international system. In a
thoughtful article synthesizing both Chinese and Western
scholarship on the concept, the scholar Barry Buzan raises the
prospect that China’s “peaceful rise” began in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, as Deng increasingly aligned China’s domestic
development and foreign policy to the nonrevolutionary world and
sought out common interests with the West. Deng’s trips abroad
offered dramatic proof of this realignment. See Barry Buzan, “China
in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?”
The Chinese Journal of International
Politics 3 (2010): 12–13.
25 “An Interview with Teng Hsiao P’ing,”
Time (February 5, 1979), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946204,00.html.
26 “China and Japan Hug and Make Up,” Time (November 6, 1978), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948275-1,00.html.
27 Henry Kamm, “Teng Begins Southeast Asian Tour to
Counter Rising Soviet Influence,” New York
Times (November 6, 1978), A1.
28 Henry Kamm, “Teng Tells the Thais Moscow-Hanoi
Treaty Perils World’s Peace,” New York
Times (November 9, 1978), A9.
29 “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen,
Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18–February 21, 1992,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, trans.,
The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994),
366.
30 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third
World to First: The Singapore Story—1965–2000 (New York:
HarperCollins, 2000), 597.
31 Ibid., 598–99.
32 Fox Butterfield, “Differences Fade as Rivals
Mingle to Honor Teng,” New York Times
(January 30, 1979), A1.
33 Joseph Lelyveld, “‘Astronaut’ Teng Gets New View
of World in Houston,” New York Times
(February 3, 1979), A1.
34 Fox Butterfield, “Teng Again Says Chinese May
Move Against Vietnam,” New York Times
(February 1, 1979), A16.
35 Joseph Lelyveld, “‘Astronaut’ Teng Gets New View
of World in Houston,” A1. For consistency with the main text of the
present volume, the quoted passage’s original spelling “Teng
Hsiao-p’ing” has been rendered as “Deng Xiaoping.”
36 Twenty-two years represented the interval
between the two world wars. Since more than twenty-two years had
elapsed since the end of the Second World War, Chinese leaders were
nervous that a certain historical rhythm was moving events. Mao had
made the same point to the Australian Communist leader E. F. Hill a
decade earlier. See also Chapter 8, “The Road to Reconciliation,”
page 207; and Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the
Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and
the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.
37 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the
President’s First Meeting with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping:
Washington, January 29th, 1979,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item
no. 268, 8–9.
38 “Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice
Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical
File—China, item no. 232-e, 14.
39 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the
President’s Meeting with the People’s Republic of China Vice
Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979, 3:35–4:59
p.m.,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 270, 10–11.
40 “Memorandum of Conversation, Carter–Deng,
Subject: Vietnam: Washington, January 29th, 1979, 5:00 p.m.–5:40
p.m.,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79,
item no. 007, 2.
41 Ross, The Indochina
Tangle, 229.
42 “Memorandum of Conversation, Carter–Deng,
Washington, January 29th, 1979, 5:00 p.m.–5:40 p.m.,” JCPL,
Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 007,
2.
43 Ibid., 5.
44 Brzezinski, Power and
Principle, 410.
45 “President Reporting on His Conversations with
Deng: January 30th, 1979,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC]
12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 009, 1.
46 Henry Scott-Stokes, “Teng Criticizes the U.S.
for a Lack of Firmness in Iran,” New York
Times (February 8, 1979), A12.
47 The lower figure appears in Bruce Elleman,
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989 (New
York: Routledge, 2001), 285. The higher figure is the estimate of
Edward O’Dowd in Chinese Military Strategy in
the Third Indochina War, 3, 45–55.
48 O’Dowd, Chinese Military
Strategy in the Third Indochina War, 45.
49 Deng Xiaoping to Jimmy Carter on January 30,
1979, as quoted in Brzezinski, Power and
Principle, 409–10.
50 “Text of Declaration by Moscow,” New York Times (February 19, 1979); Craig R.
Whitney, “Security Pact Cited: Moscow Says It Will Honor Terms of
Treaty—No Direct Threat Made,” New York
Times (February 19, 1979), A1.
51 Edward Cowan, “Blumenthal Delivers Warning,”
New York Times (February 28, 1979),
A1.
52 Ibid.
53 One of the few scholars to challenge this
conventional wisdom—and to emphasize the conflict’s anti-Soviet
dimension—is Bruce Elleman, in his Modern
Chinese Warfare, 284–97.
54 For a review of various estimates of PLA
casualties, see O’Dowd, Chinese Military
Strategy in the Third Indochina War, 45.
55 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the
President’s First Meeting with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping:
Washington, January 29th, 1979,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item
no. 268, 8.
56 “Memorandum, President Reporting on His
Conversations with Deng: January 30th, 1979,” JCPL, Brzezinski
Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/ 78–10/3/79, item no. 009,
2.
57 “Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, January 8th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl.
Far East, Box No. 69, Brown (Harold) Trip Memcons, 1/80, File,
16.
58 “Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, January 8th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl.
Far East, Box No. 69, Brown (Harold) Trip Memcons, 1/80, File,
15.
59 “President Carter’s Instructions to Zbigniew
Brzezinski for His Mission to China, May 17, 1978,” in Brzezinski,
Power and Principle, Annex I,
4.
60 By one estimate, as of 1986 Vietnam stationed
“700,000 combat troops in the northern portion of the country.”
Karl D. Jackson, “Indochina, 1982–1985: Peace Yields to War,” in
Solomon and Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East
Military Buildup, as cited in Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 206.
61 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the Vice
President’s Meeting with People’s Republic of China Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, August 28th, 1979, 9:30 a.m.–12:00 noon,”
JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 279, 9.
62 “Memorandum of Conversation Between President
Carter and Premier Hua Guofeng of the People’s Republic of China:
Tokyo, July 10th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Subj. File, Box No.
38, “Memcons: President, 7/80.”
63 As quoted in Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994), 149.
64 “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of Dr.
Brzezinski’s Conversation with Vice Premier Geng Biao of the
People’s Republic of China: Washington, May 29th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA
Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 70, “Geng Biao Visit, 5/23–31/80,”
Folder, 5.
65 Lee, From Third World to
First, 603.