Differences in Perspective
As the new century
progressed, two trends emerged, in some respects working against
each other. On many issues, Sino-American relations evolved in a
largely cooperative manner. At the same time, differences rooted in
history and geopolitical orientation began to be apparent. Economic
issues and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are
good examples.
Economic Issues: When China was a minor player in the
world economy, the exchange rate for its currency was not an issue;
even during the 1980s and 1990s, it would have seemed improbable
that the value of the yuan would become a daily point of dispute in
American political debate and media analysis. But China’s economic
rise and growing U.S.-China economic interdependence turned the
once arcane issue into a daily controversy, with American
frustrations—and Chinese suspicions about American
intentions—expressed in increasingly insistent
language.
The fundamental
difference arises over the concept underlying the two sides’
respective currency policies. In the American view, the low value
of the yuan (also known as the renminbi) is treated as currency
manipulation favoring Chinese companies and, by extension, harming
American companies operating in the same general industries. An
undervalued yuan is said to contribute to the loss of American
jobs—a point of serious political and emotional consequence in an
age of incipient American austerity. In the Chinese view, the
pursuit of a currency policy that favors domestic manufacturers is
not an economic policy so much as an expression of China’s need for
political stability. Thus in explaining to an American audience in
September 2010 why China would not drastically revalue its
currency, Wen Jiabao used social, not financial, arguments: “You
don’t know how many Chinese companies would go bankrupt. There
would be major disturbances. Only the Chinese premier has such
pressure on his shoulders. This is the reality.”6
The United States
treats economic issues from the point of view of the requirements
of global growth. China considers the political implications, both
domestic and international. When America urges China to consume
more and export less, it puts forward an economic maxim. But for
China, a shrinking export sector means a perhaps significant
increase in unemployment with political consequences. Ironically,
from the long-range point of view, were China to adopt the American
conventional wisdom, it might reduce its incentives for ties with
America because it would be less dependent on exports and foster
the development of an Asian bloc because it would imply enhanced
economic ties with neighboring countries.
The underlying issue
is therefore political not economic. A concept of mutual benefit
rather than recriminations over alleged misconduct must emerge.
This makes it important to evolve the concept of co-evolution and
of Pacific Community discussed in the epilogue.
Nonproliferation and North Korea: Throughout the Cold
War, nuclear weapons were in the possession primarily of the United
States and the Soviet Union. For all their ideological and
geopolitical hostility, their calculation of risk was essentially
parallel, and they possessed the technical means to protect
themselves against accident, unauthorized launches, and, to a
considerable extent, surprise attack. But as nuclear weapons
spread, this balance is in jeopardy: the calculation of risk is no
longer symmetrical; and technical safeguards against accidental
launch or even theft will be much more difficult, if not
impossible, to implement—especially for countries without the
expertise of the superpowers.
As proliferation
accelerates, the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly
abstract. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring
whom and by what calculations. Even if it is assumed that new
nuclear countries have the same reluctance as the established ones
with respect to initiating nuclear hostilities against each
other—an extremely dubious judgment—they may use their weapons to
protect terrorist or rogue state assaults on the international
order. Finally, the experience with the “private” proliferation
network of apparently friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya,
and Iran demonstrates the vast consequences to the international
order of the spread of nuclear weapons, even when the proliferating
country does not meet the formal criteria of a rogue
state.
The spread of these
weapons into hands not restrained by the historical and political
considerations of the major states augurs a world of devastation
and human loss without precedent even in our age of genocidal
killings.
It is ironic that
nuclear proliferation in North Korea should emerge on the agenda of
the dialogue between Washington and Beijing, for it is over Korea
that the United States and the People’s Republic of China first
encountered each other on the battlefield sixty years ago. In 1950,
the just established People’s Republic went to war with the United
States because it saw in a permanent American military presence on
its border with Korea a threat to Chinese long-term security. Sixty
years later, the commitment of North Korea to a military nuclear
program has created a new challenge re-creating some of the same
geopolitical issues.
For the first ten
years of North Korea’s nuclear program, China took the position
that it was a matter for the United States and North Korea to
settle between themselves. Because North Korea felt threatened
primarily by the United States, so the Chinese argument went, it
was chiefly up to the United States to provide it with the
requisite sense of security to substitute for nuclear weapons. With
the passage of time it became obvious that nuclear proliferation
into North Korea would sooner or later affect China’s security. If
North Korea were to be accepted as a nuclear power, it is highly
likely that Japan and South Korea, and possibly other Asian
countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, would ultimately also join
the nuclear club, altering the strategic landscape of
Asia.
China’s leaders
oppose such an outcome. But equally, China fears a catastrophic
collapse of North Korea, since that could re-create at its borders
the very conditions it fought to prevent sixty years
ago.
The internal
structure of the Korean regime compounds the problem. Though it
proclaims itself to be a Communist state, its actual authority is
in the hands of a single family. In 2011, at this writing, the head
of the ruling family is in the process of devolving his power to a
twenty-seven-year-old son with no previous experience of even
Communist management, much less international relations. The
possibility of an implosion from unpredictable or unknowable
elements is ever present. Affected countries might then feel
obliged to protect their vital interests by unilateral measures. By
that time, it would be too late or perhaps too complicated to
coordinate action. To prevent such an outcome must be an essential
part of a Sino-American dialogue and of the Six Party Talks
involving the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and the two
Koreas.