Dai Bingguo—A Reaffirmation of Peaceful Rise
China’s leaders
decided to take a hand in the debate at this point, to demonstrate
that the published triumphalism is far from the mood of the
leadership. In December 2010, State Councilor Dai Bingguo (the
highest-ranking official overseeing China’s foreign policy) entered
the lists with a comprehensive statement of policy. 26 With the title
“Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development,” Dai’s
article may be seen as a response both to foreign observers
concerned that China harbors aggressive intentions, and to those
within China—including, one posits, some in the Chinese leadership
structure—who argue that China should
adopt a more insistent posture.
Peaceful development,
Dai argues, is neither a ruse by which China “hides its brightness
and bides its time” (as some non-Chinese now suspect) nor a naive
delusion that forfeits China’s advantages (as some within China now
charge). It is China’s genuine and enduring policy because it best
serves Chinese interests and comports with the international
strategic situation:
Persisting with taking the path of peaceful development is not the product of a subjective imagination or of some kind of calculations. Rather, it is the result of our profound recognition that both the world today and China today have undergone tremendous changes as well as that China’s relations with the world today have also undergone great changes; hence it is necessary to make the best of the situation and adapt to the changes.27
The world, Dai
observes, has grown smaller, and major issues now require an
unprecedented degree of global interaction. Global cooperation is,
therefore, in China’s self-interest; it is not a strategy for
advancing a purely national policy. Dai continues with what could
be read as a standard affirmation of the demand of the people of
the world for peace and cooperation—though in context, it is more
likely a warning about the obstacles a militant China would face
(probably it is addressed to both audiences):
Because of economic globalization and the in-depth development of informatization, as well as the rapid advances in science and technology, the world has become increasingly “smaller” and has turned into a “global village.” With the interaction and interdependence of all countries as well as the intersection of interests reaching an unprecedented level, their common interests have become more extensive, the problems which require them joining hands to address them have multiplied, and the aspirations for mutually beneficial cooperation have grown stronger. 28
China, he writes, can
thrive in such a situation because it is broadly integrated into
the world. In the past thirty years it has grown by linking its
talents and resources to a broader international system, not as a
tactical device but as a means of fulfilling the necessities of the
contemporary period:
Contemporary China is undergoing broad and profound changes. Following more than 30 years of reform and opening up, we have shifted from “class struggle as the key” to economic construction as the central task as we comprehensively carry out the cause of socialist modernization. We have shifted from engaging in a planned economy to promoting reform in all aspects as we build a socialist market economic system. We have shifted from a state of isolation and one-sided emphasis on self-reliance to opening up to the outside world and development of international cooperation.29
These “earthshaking”
changes require that China abandon the vestiges of Mao’s doctrine
of absolute self-reliance, which would isolate China. If China
fails to correctly analyze the situation and, as Dai insists, “very
satisfactorily manage our relations with the external world,” then
the chances offered by the current strategic opportunity period
“may likely be lost.” China, Dai emphasizes, “is a member of the
big international family.” Beyond representing simply moral
aspirations, China’s harmonious and cooperative policies “are what
are most compatible with our interests and those of other
countries.”30 Lingering beneath the surface of this
analysis, though never stated directly, is the recognition that
China has a host of neighbors with significant military and
economic capacities of their own, and that China’s relations with
almost all of them have deteriorated over the past one to two
years—a trend the Chinese leadership is seeking to
reverse.
With leaders of any
country describing their strategies, a tactical element can never
be excluded, as there was with the amendment of the phrase
“peaceful rise” to the blander “peaceful development.” In Dai’s
article, he specifically addresses foreign skepticism that his
arguments may be largely tactical:
Internationally, there are some people who say: China has a saying: “Hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time, and endeavor to achieve something.” So they speculate that China’s declaration of taking a path of peaceful development is a secret conspiracy carried out under circumstances in which it is still not powerful.
But this, Dai writes,
is “groundless suspicion”:
This statement was first made by Comrade Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s, early 1990s. Its main connotation is: China should remain humble and cautious as well as refrain from taking the lead, from waving the flag, from seeking expansion, and from claiming hegemony; this is consistent with the idea of taking the path of peaceful development.31
Peaceful development,
Dai stresses, is a task for many generations. The importance of the
task is underscored by the suffering of generations past. China
does not want revolution; it does not want war or revenge; it
simply wants the Chinese people to “bid farewell to poverty and
enjoy a better life” and for China to become—in contrast to the
taunting rejectionism of Mao—“the most responsible, the most
civilized, and the most law abiding and orderly member of the
international community.”32
Of course, however
much grander goals might be disclaimed, countries in the
region—those that have seen the waxing and waning of previous
Chinese empires, some of them stretching further than the current
political borders of the People’s Republic of China—find such
disclaimers difficult to reconcile with China’s growing power and
historical record. Will a country that, for most of its modern
period—which in China starts two thousand years ago—regarded itself
as the pinnacle of civilization, and that for nearly two centuries
has regarded its uniquely moral world leadership position to have
been usurped by the rapaciousness of Western and Japanese colonial
powers, be content to limit its strategic goals to “build[ing] a
moderately prosperous society in all aspects” ?33
It must, Dai answers.
China is “not in a position to be arrogant and boastful” because it
still faces tremendous challenges domestically. The Gross Domestic
Product of China, no matter how large in absolute numbers, has to
be spread over a population of 1.3 billion, of whom 150 million
live below the poverty line; therefore “the economic and social
problems that we encounter can be said to be the biggest and
thorniest issues in the world; hence we are not in a position to be
arrogant and boastful.”34
Dai rejects claims
that China will seek to dominate Asia or to displace the United
States as the world’s preeminent power as “pure myths” that
contradict China’s historical record and its current policies. He
includes a striking invitation from Deng Xiaoping—so contrary to
China’s usual insistence on self-reliance—to the effect that the
world would be allowed to “supervise” China to confirm it would
never seek hegemony: “Comrade Deng Xiaoping once stated: If one day
China should seek to claim hegemony in the world, then the people
of the world should expose, oppose and even fight against it. On
this point, the international community can supervise us.”35
Dai’s is a powerful
and eloquent statement. Having spent many hours over a decade with
this thoughtful and responsible leader, I do not question his
sincerity or intent. Still, granting that Hu, Dai, and their
colleagues are stating in full candor their perspective for the
next stage in Chinese policy, it is difficult to imagine that this
will be the last word on China’s world role or that it will remain
uncontested. A new generation of younger Chinese and rising Party
and PLA elites will come into office in 2012—the first generation
since the early nineteenth century to have grown up in a China that
is at peace, and politically unified, that did not experience the
Cultural Revolution, and whose economic performance outstrips that
of most of the rest of the world. The fifth generation of Chinese
leaders since the creation of the People’s Republic, they will, as
did their predecessors, distill their experiences into a view of
the world and a vision of national greatness. It is on the dialogue
with this generation that American strategic thinking needs to
occupy itself.
By the time the Obama
administration took office, relations had fallen into a distinct
pattern. Both Presidents proclaimed their commitment to
consultation, even to partnership. But their media and much elite
opinion increasingly affirmed a different view.
During Hu Jintao’s
state visit in January 2011, extensive consultation procedures were
reinforced. They will permit increased U.S.-China dialogue on
issues as they arise, such as the Korea problem, and attempts to
overcome some lingering issues, such as the exchange rate and
differing views on the definition of freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea.
What remains to be
dealt with is to move from crisis management to a definition of
common goals, from the solution of strategic controversies to their
avoidance. Is it possible to evolve a genuine partnership and a
world order based on cooperation? Can China and the United States
develop genuine strategic trust?